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PARAMETER$ FOR CRITERIA DEBATING

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"[M]oney, relative to other measures of value, should become less important as we slough toward the millennium. The catch is that, as soon as you say anything that could remotely be construed as anti-money, it sounds like the sixties. The very words smell of reefer. They conjure images of bearded vegetarians in flannel shirts, and hippie chicks who didn't shave their armpits. They open one to that most damning of charges: not pragmatic" (Shames, 1989, p. 189). America's search for values in an age of greed is not proceeding well at all.

We justify the bombing of a Libyan compound to deter terrorism and produce a net saving of human life. We forget that Truman used the same calculus when he decided to obliterate the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We justify the deaths of 73 children from Progeria, the aging disease. Because the disease has an incidence of 1:8,000,000 births, pharmaceutical companies won't fund research for a cure; it's not cost-efficient. We justify criminal behavior as patriotic without even knowing his criminal's value calculus.

> "Back at his NSC office on November 25, (1986), the day he was fired, [Oliver] North sat down to list the priorities that had motivated him:
>
> 1. my country
> 2. Presidency
> 3. family
> 4. hostages
> 5. others who helped
>
> Right before `others who helped,' North had written `self,' but then crossed it out." (Emerson, 1988, p. 234)

Maybe, altruism is dead. Maybe not. More likely, values continue to evolve, or according to some, devolve, but, for certain, our instruments to discover and test this d/evolution are not keeping pace.

PREMISE:

Is the search for values worth it? Yes. "An enlarged concept of rhetoric is necessary if we are to comprehend the substantial and dynamic sense in which rhetoric functions to generate continuous validation of ways in which communities act together" (Scott, 1973, p. 88).

But values are unavoidable. True. However, value argumentation presupposes that the calculus the critic uses to decide which arguer did the better debating engages criteria which explore a value. Traditionally, that calculus is introduced by the arguer affirming the resolutional claim.

By default, this is the common practice: a debater argues "the

most important value in this debate is life." AND, our criteria, rule utilitarian: "the team which saves the most lives wins the debate." The opponent argues: "rights are more important than lives." One arguer counts corpses and the other cites philosophical discourse. Apples are compared to kumquats, the critic becomes confused, and she decides she likes the demeanor of the affirmative more than the negative, and votes affirmative.

One of the most important areas in need of elucidation in debating values is the role, if any, criteria should play in resolving argument disposition when value comparisons become difficult. Before offering some options, we begin with an understanding of criteria.

DEFINITIONS:

What is criteria?

First, it isn't a value and it isn't a fact though it could be valuable and factual, rather it's a calculus used to resolve value conflicts. Didn't Toulmin solve this years ago when he bifurcated force and criteria when examining modal terms? As you may recall:

> A word like `good' can be used equally of an apple or an agent or an action,// of a volley in tennis, a vacuum-cleaner or a Van Gogh. . . . // A morally-good action, a domestically-good vacuum-cleaner and a pomiculturally-good apple all come up to standard, but the standards they all come up to will be different--indeed, incomparable. So one can distinguish between the commendatory force of labelling a thing as `good', and the criteria by reference to which we justify a commendation. (1985, pp. 32-33)

Saying something is "good" is a value assignment. Saying why it is "good" is the criteria.

The word criterion, from the Greek, is defined as a means for judging. It's further defined at least three ways. It can refer to an organ of judging, e.g. "The criterion for Truth is not Sense but Right Reason." [Criterion was not used this way by Wittgenstein.] A second way criterion is used is in the sense of a test, principle, rule, canon or standard by which anything is judged. The third way is as a distinguishing mark or characteristic attached to a thing, by which it can be judged or estimated. These separate meanings are subtle and become blurred as we approach the function of criteria in resolving value arguments. Nevertheless, all three are employed in some strange and wonderful configuration.

By logical necessity, therefore, "A criterion for a given thing's being so is something that can show the thing to be so and show by its absence that the thing is not so: it is some thing by which one may be justified in saying that the thing is so and by whose absence one may be justified is saying that the thing is not so" (Kenny, 1967, p. 258).

Wittgenstein (1958) took to task the definition of criterion. He admitted that in different circumstances we apply different

criteria for a person's reading (Sec. 164), and he spoke of the great variety of criteria for personal identity (Sec. 404). He granted that there may be different necessary criteria for the same phenomenon as determined by the situation. Context determines text. Wittgenstein meant that each situation modified the formal characteristics of a phenomenon such that in different situations, no two phenomena, regardless how similar, are identical. What is necessary for resolving liberty conflicts among the Mau Mau in 1940 would be different from resolving liberty conflicts among the Nez Perce in 1870.

As a result, criteria may clash and when they do for a single phenomenon, one is always better. "For if there are two independent criteria for a single state of affairs, it is possible that the two criteria may conflict, and in that case, at least one of them is not decisive" (Kenny, 1967, p. 259). If one criterion is less decisive than the other, then one might be better. "[A] criterion, while not being necessarily conclusive evidence, is nonetheless the best possible evidence for the state of affairs for which it is a criterion" (Kenny, 1967, p. 259).

This essay tries to approach the phenomenon of criteriology from a deep or thick Rylean perspective: what we think criteria may be, what is seems to be, what we see it becoming, and what we would like it to be.

ROLE AND FUNCTION:

Why criteria? There can be little doubt criteria are an important element of value argumentation. Zarefsky wrote that "each type of non-policy question **requires** judgment on the standards or criteria for decision" (1976, p. 15). Brownlee believed they were **fundamental** (1987, p. 59) to any case. They both rightfully argue that criteria is a priori. Prior to resolving substantive arguments, the critic and audience will decide which filter s/he/they will use in disposition.

Others have gone even further. Cole et al wrote that "criteria arguments are . . . a **prima faciae** burden in non-policy argumentation" (1986, p. 36). This perspective would mean that "the negative can refute affirmative criteria and thus justify a negative ballot" (p. 41).

Criteria may be prima faciae for these reasons: first, if presumption rests against the resolution and the affirmative is unable to establish criteria such that the value they claim is important can be compared to countervalues introduced by the negative, then the critic is left with no alternative but to conclude that the affirmative has failed to meet its burden of proof and the negative wins.

Secondly, Church and Wilbanks wrote that "without criteria . . . defining the key evaluative terms, non-policy propositions would be neither understood nor debated" (1986, p. 50). Almost in a Wittgensteinean sense, they are suggesting that without a tacit agreement that both opponents will be discussing the same concept, there can be no grounds for debate and the affirmative would have

failed to meet the only agreed upon prima faciae obligation in non-policy debate: defining terms.

Why? Because failure to establish and defend criteria converts the public discourse into a private one. "By a `private' language is meant one that not merely is not but **cannot** be understood by anyone other than the speaker" (Malcolm, 1954, p.p. 530-31). Absent criteria, advocates' arguments become individual reports and identifications which evade any deep inquiry.

Third, criteria may be a prerequisite of advocacy.

> For if a man satisfies the criteria for meaning a sentence in a certain way (and is not insincere in uttering it), then he also satisfies the criteria for having thought something and said what he thought. (Strawson, 1954, p. 89)

It is important to note that this burden of definition is not overwhelming.

> It is commonplace in the history of thought that a conceptual scheme is rarely abandoned because of criticism, however devastating. It is, after all, more sensible to attempt reconstruction of a battered position than to wander around in the open battlefield. But if an alternative defensible position can be provided, abandonment of the first is greatly accelerated. (Scriven, 1959, p. 859)

Scriven is correct: criteria are language rules which only act a priori. However, their explicit absence does not moot the communication process since some criterial rules are implicit to our language. "Our everyday language uses `criteria'; we appeal, in defending and justifying judgments, in the course of speaking with one another, to features of things that are in Wittgenstein's sense criteria" (Canfield, 1981, p. 32). As a result, it is unclear whether criteria can function as a prima faciae issue when default criteria of sorts can be found implicit to language. Our language has consensual features: when I say artistic, we know it includes visual but excludes written art. That understanding is due to mutually agreed criteria, and when criteria is neither discussed nor presumably granted, the critic and audience will impose either their own or another drawn from the subtext of the substantive arguments before them. Though criteria is important and useful, it is not prima faciae.

The primary logical purpose of criteria is to reduce reliance on inductive systems. "A concept is vacuous if there is no criterion for its application. This doctrine does not lead to verificationism without the added thesis that a criterion is a piece of conclusive evidence. It leads to the weaker conclusion that a concept is vacuous unless there is something that counts as noninductive evidence for its application" (Kenny, 1967, p. 260). For Wittgenstein and Anthony Kenny, if the arguer affirms a rule, then the test would best be done non-inductively. "For if there cannot be noninductive evidence for the application of a concept, then it seems there cannot be inductive evidence for its application either, since inductive correlations presuppose the

possibility of noninductively identifying the phenomena to be correlated" (Kenny, 1967, p. 260). For Aristotle, criteria was a syllogistic premise and for Toulmin, it's a warrant. Consequently, criteria function to resolve the whole resolution and hasty generalization inductive fallacy by reducing the scope of the resolutional claim by making only some of the substantive arguments relevant to the critic and audience's decision calculus.

CLASSIFICATION:

Finding criteria is not easy. Montaigne discovered that:

> To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a **procedure** for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really **succeeds** in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are **false.** And so we are caught in a circle. (1933, p. 544)

Where can we find criteria? Value criteria come in three forms: **relative, absolute,** and **interpolative;** these relate to three schools of thought in this field: particularism, methodism and coherentism.

In the **relative** category, there are at least three ways to discern when one value may be preferred over another. Boggs discussed them: **social values, cost-benefit** analysis, and **exigence and salience.**

With **social values,** Boggs suggested the conflict is resolved "by simply deducing which side is upholding previously established standards" (1987, p. 27). In **cost-benefit** analysis, we decide which value is either intrinsically or extrinsically better than the other by examining its effects. In **exigence** and **salience,** "[t]he most urgently needed, or most threatened value, as publicly recognized, is the higher value in a given situation ...; `exigence' is an urgent need, whereas `salience' is the interest shown for the urgent need by an audience" (1987, p. 28). Bitzer defined exigence somewhat differently than Boggs. For him, exigence "is an obstacle, something waiting to be done" (1986, p. 6).

These relative calculi have failed as criteria for value argumentation. Since **cost-benefit analysis** has been assailed elsewhere (see, most recently, Brownlee and Crossman, 1989), consider the methods of **social values** and **exigence and salience.** Both of these calculi suffer from the same fundamental flaws.

First, social values are not discernible. As Matlon indicated in 1988, presumption for value issues is nearly impossible to locate (p. 8), and they are dependent on external authority which makes them useless (an issue addressed later).

Second, utilizing extant values as a test for rightness or

goodness presupposes that extant values are right and good. Of course, history is full of examples ranging from apartheid in the Republic of South Africa to using American men, women, and children as a human defense shield in Iraq, extant and somewhat popular, yet questionably right.

Third, hierarchies are groundless. Hierarchies "assure an ordering of everything subject to its governing principle" (Perelman, 1969, p. 80). Kolnai rejected them on the planes of social philosophy and in the context of axiology.

For example, he postulated a hierarchy "a flattened world from which the experience of verticality is all but wholly excluded" (1978, p. 165). Like the Native American view of the eternal loop, this system has no beginning or end, no higher or lower, and no bigger or smaller. It is based on the belief that everything is interconnected and non-rigorous evidence or reasoning is neither disingenuous nor irrelevant.

Also, Perelman discussed the confounding double hierarchy.

> Sometimes the hierarchies are presented as so closely related that one hierarchy serves as criterion or definition for the other. When we hear the assertion that a certain man is stronger than another because he can lift heavier weights, we are not always sure if this latter hierarchy serves as foundation or as criterion for the first. (1969, p. 337)

Consequently, the criteria is circular.

Ulrich, eighteen years later, argued that formal value structuring in hierarchies had minimal utility (1986). Even Maslow agreed in a sense when asked to name three self-actualized persons could name only three: Byron, Van Gogh and Wagner.

Another way to treat values is as **absolutes**. Discussions of this nature draw from deontology or "duty ethics." The Divine Command Theory is a paradigm deontological theory. Vallentyne defined these as "theories that do not make the right depend **solely** on considerations of goodness" (1987, p. 24). This single mindedness, of course, was discussed in Kant's categorical imperative, another paradigm case. Popular examples in value debating are: R. Curtis' **evolutionary imperative** (1982, p. 352) where he argues that the survival of the race is "the consummate value confronting all peoples," and Brooks defined some things as **especially wrong**: things as beliefs or acts which "refuse full humanity to another human being" (1983, p. 309).

There are at least two problems with this approach. First, this process may be inappropriate for the rhetorical method. Ethical statements that cannot be universalized within the field of ethics cannot be accepted as moral rules. Is rhetoric an appropriate medium to resolve moral rules? Maybe not. That was one of Fisher's theses in 1965 and again in 1981.

Second, this approach is blinding. Toulmin explained.

> The dangers of such single-mindedness become apparent when philosophers of this kind begin to generalize: preoccupied as they are with some one type of valuation, they blind themselves to the special problems involved in other sorts--to all the difficulties of aesthetic judgment, and to many of the issues facing one in the course of one's moral life. They are many sorts of assessment and grading besides the appraisal of legislative programmes and social reforms, and standards which may be wholly inappropriate when judging the worthiness of a Bill before Parliament can be misleading or out-of-place when we are concerned with a painting, an apple or even our individual moral quandaries. (1985, p. 34)

The final calculi are **interpolative**. They are innumerable. Unlike the aforementioned, they are fully arguable without resorting to authority. Interpolative criteria are explored in each debate round, improving both clash and discovery. They are preferred.

These are similar to what Gilbert Harman calls **inner judgments** (1975). They make sense only in relation to an implicit agreement among a group of people in relation to one another. **Inner judgments**, furthermore, have two important characteristics.

> First, they imply that the agent has reasons to do something. Second, the speaker in some sense endorses these reasons and supposes the audience also endorses them. (Harman, 1975, p. 8)

The similarity to what we do in CEDA debate is clear. To no one's surprise, therefore, interpolative criteria are popular. Here are three examples.

Boggs described **anteriority**. "Claims such as `our criteria absorb, supersede, or subsume theirs' are common arguments in non-policy debate, and usually function as truncated expressions of the anteriority standard. . . ." (Boggs, 1987, p. 29). Example: freedom presupposes right to protest.

Mercier provided us with the interpolative calculi of **immediacy**. Immediacy means without any intervening medium or agency. Unlike exigence and salience, with immediacy there is no requisite public sanction; immediacy answers the question: what denominative or foundational value is the most cherished under the instant circumstances. Mercier wrote "to be sure, a certain conviction may rest upon many different reasons some of which are subordinate to others. But if we are to avoid an infinite regress, then we must find a ground of assent that presupposes no other" (1923, p. 234). An example: when a wall of molten lava is oozing toward an Hawaiian town, survival is an immediate value. Absent the lava, freedom may be.

Another interpolative calculi is **mutual erosion**. "[I]n many cases there is an inverse ratio between the criteria which are used; merit, from the common sense point of view, is a matter of inner disposition toward the good and of sacrifice: establishing a hierarchy of merits requires the introduction of these incompatible factors" (Perelman, 1969, p. 243). Two values may not be able to coexist with force. An example: meritocracy and egalitarianism are mutually eroding.

CRITERIAL STANDARDS:

When are criteria better than others? There are at least three superstandards for criterial calculi: these are means to defend and indict criterial choices.

A caveat: the following is not meant to suggest that an arguer can argue there is no value just that the calculus for resolving incompatible values is flawed. Perelman wrote: "a person . . . may not reject all values as a whole: this would amount to leaving the realm of discussion to enter that of force . . . [i]n this respect, values are comparable to facts: for, when one of the interlocutors puts forward a value, one must argue to get rid of it, under pain of refusing the discussion; and in general, the argument will imply that other values are accepted" (1969, p. 65). Some end value is a prerequisite to value debating.

CLARITY:

The first superstandard of **clarity** was mentioned by Brownlee in 1987. A criterion "should avoid tacit or implicit assumptions" (p. 60). Brownlee borrowed substantially from Vedung who wrote that "obscurity cannot be tolerated in rational political discourse" and Vedung found three main sources of obscurity: "because some things are left out or tacit, because words are unclear, or because the presentation has been unsystematic and confused" (p. 33). Later, Vedung added that obscurity may be unconscious "when a speaker shifts between different senses of the same term" (p. 127) [term shift] and it may be conscious: "obscurity is used to gain political advantage" (p. 128).

The problem with this standard: in language, tacit assumptions are inescapable because definition functions from tacit and implicit assumptions. Language is inherently vague. In an absolutist sense, ". . . no word ever has exactly the same meaning twice" (Hayakawa, 1949, p. 60). However, this is much too rigid. "No statement is indispensable for a language to exist--and one can always posit, in place of any statement, another statement that would in no way modify the language" (Foucault, 1972, pp. 80-1). This is especially true, when we accept that fact, as Vedung did, that our language is often purposefully obscure. "Many terms [in our language] . . . are flexible in application by design and serve an excellent practical purpose" (Landau, 1984, p. 149).

Clarity and tacit/implicit assumptions as tests of a criterion have been only moderately useful. As a rough and early test of criteria, it can sift out grossly inappropriate calculi. However, stronger tests are available from Wittgenstein.

First, a criterion is clear when it explains the **grammar** of a term and assigns it meaning (1958, p. 24). Wittgenstein meant both surface and deep grammar here: not only how a term is/can be used but also why the term given its epistemological frame is usable in such a manner. Example: the word "constitution" functions as a noun but its deeper grammar would require that a constitution would entail the process of constituting and that meaning most probably would be exclusive to Western models of political organization. A criterion for "constitution" would need to ponder the process of

creating and the basic Western political document. A constitution would neither be a physique of a representative nor the unwritten law of an unincorporated tribe. Additionally, it must establish meaning, a concept discussed later.

Second, "the criterion for a thing's being so (if any) is in one respect the **primary phenomenon** by which one may judge that it is so" (Albritton, 1959, p. 849). Wittgenstein would squirm at the semantic wordplay found in CEDA debate whereby an arguer would posit the value of freedom with a criterion of greatest restriction, or the value of education with a criterion of least structured schooling environment. Restriction is hardly a primary phenomenon associated with freedom and least structure is hardly a primary phenomenon of education, Ophuls (1977) and Illich (1971) notwithstanding.

SUBSTANTIVE BELONGINGNESS:

A second superstandard is drawn from Vedung: It is "close **substantive belongingness** to the subject matter" (1982, p. 36). "Which criteria are relevant to the use of a term on any particular occasion will depend primarily upon the circumstances under which it is used" (Wellman, 1962, p. 438). While this standard smacks of representativeness and that perplexing fallacy in induction. That is not the case.

Three tests: the first is **intrinsic attribute**. As Kenny explained "`X' is not a criterion for `Y' if someone could learn the meaning of `Y' without having grasped the connection between `X' and `Y'" (1967, p. 259). Wellman tried to explain the interconnection in his early study on Wittgenstein. "Criteria are observable features which are directly connected to the expression by its meaning" (1962, p. 437). They function like an axiom, "a necessary proposition which is such that one cannot understand it without thereby knowing that it is true" (Chisholm, 1973, p. 32). A criterion for the use of "is justified" will be a logically necessary condition for the correct use of "is justified."

This led especially Wittgenstein and some others to distinguish a difference between criterion and symptom. "The falling barometer is a `symptom' that it is raining; it's looking like that outdoors (think how you would teach the word `rain' to a child) is the `criterion' of rain" (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 354). Wellman wrote: "Symptoms are features which are indirectly connected to the expression by being associated with the criteria in our experience" (p. 437). If a criterion is descriptive only, then it is a symptom. And the presence of a symptom does not guarantee the presence of a rule. Since symptoms are sufficient descriptions only, they are not certain. Only defining criteria carry certainty: sufficient to justify the decision. "The difference between criteria and symptoms is that the evidential value of symptoms is something taught by experience, while the evidential value of criteria is something founded on a definition" (Kenny, 1967, p. 259).

An example: a debater may argue that things are right which

maximize happiness. Foreign investment in the US may disemploy working American parents. Unemployed parents may deny children trips to theme parks. Children are less happy. Foreign investment is not right? This type of metaphorical reasoning is symptomatic in the Wittgensteinean sense. There are many reasons children are not happy and many reasons, for example, children fail to visit Heritage, USA. The problem here is that visiting theme parks is not an intrinsic feature of being the head of a household and in turn, the failure to holiday at theme parks is not an intrinsic features of foreign investment in the US.

Unfortunately, in non-policy argumentation, many arguers present criteria which merely describe a proof and then present that description, and beg the critic to dispose of the proof in the favor of the arguers who fulfill their description--an elaborate circular argument. This practice would mistakenly give this pseudo-procedural argument a priori force. It should not be so.

Second test: Is the criterion **rational**? "The problem of value judgments entails the process of finding a rational basis for the dissociation and [even] hierarchization of the values which occur within the human situation" (Grunberg, 1978, p. 126). As Grunberg concluded, "Value judgments no longer appear as undefinable, as making no sense, as non-cognitive, but as discernible by reason, testable by experience, and apt to be qualified as true or false" (p. 133). Clearly, some criteria make more sense: "there are things--notably persons, actions and intentions--which even the most contrary ages agree in admiring. It seems simply stupid not to admire the self-sacrifices of Antigone, Jesus, Joan of Arc, Fanya Kaplan--even though we would probably not choose their ideals nor their sacrifices, and that with a clear conscience" (Kraenzel, 1987, p. 326).

However, too many arguers and critics in CEDA debate have either participated in and/or defended against a whine by an arguer that a rational criterion was unfair because rebuttal options were not easily apparent. For example, during the handgun topic, some students argued rationality as a criterion for justification such that restrictions on handgun ownership by dangerous psychopaths was justified because there appeared no rationale to arm the dangerous. Opponents whined and whimpered and convinced a critic or two not to vote for the arguers advocating the criterion of rationality. Any thinking person would have been appalled. Here were arguers being punished for using a criterion with substantive belongingness.

Norman Malcolm explained the fallacy involved in this hypothetical debate. Criterion can function as **decisive evidence**. "[T]he application of a criterion must be able to yield either an affirmative or a negative result" (Malcolm, 1959, pp. 24 & 60), **not** both. A criterion with substantive belongingness may in itself constitute sufficient reasons to justify the decision, and sometimes an arguer develops a case simply stronger than the wits of the opponent or even the critic.

As Wellman concluded, "which criteria are relevant to the use of a term on any particular occasion will depend primarily upon the circumstances under which it is used. All of this means that the

kind of justification which can be given for applying a descriptive expression is more complicated than appeared at first glace." (p. 438). The working criterion is uniquely tied to the phenomenon being judged. "[T]he presence of the criterion is linked to the thing of which the criterion is a criterion via a convention, definition, rule of language, or truth of grammar or depth grammar. It is this fact that accounts for the special status--that of tautology statements of criteria" (Canfield, 1981, p. 36).

Can an arguer find a necessary criteria for a term? Yes! The solution was first advanced by Wittgenstein in 1958. **Family likeness** (p. 17) may help resolve the quandary. He implied that in justifying the use of an expression by giving its criteria one will normally have to give more than one criterion. "That the presence of the criterion is not always necessary for the presence of the thing follows from the assumption that there can be several criteria for one thing" (Canfield, 1981, p. 39). However, this concept of severalness doesn't presume that each criterion making up the criteria act independently. Rather, they may function synergistically working as a family, like the many rules used to play the one game.

The third test: **prescription**. "Moral principles are typically taken as guides for action" (Shadish, 1982, p. 223). Shadish cited Hare (1970) to hypothesize that "a principle isn't a moral principle unless its advocate is sincerely committed to governing his behavior in accordance with it in the situation to which the principle universally applied" (p. 223). This does not mean all principles are universally concretized into policy. Not at all. Colbert recently wrote that after endorsing a resolution an arguer must defend outcomes (1989/90). His premise is wrong: advocating an idea does not necessarily imply endorsement, and his conclusion is wrong: outcomes are not necessary functions of endorsement. The fit between principle and policy would have to be fully consistent. The result, the value objection must be the **inescapable** result of the endorsement. If that occurs, or rather to borrow a phrase from Gonzaga's debaters, **but for** the endorsement, the impact would not occur. In reality, we know that behavior is often very inconsistent with belief structures, but when a **prescriptive** dystopia can be illustrated as inescapable with the defended moral principles endorsed by an arguer (hardly a common phenomenon), then this test can have awesome probative force. Example: Just because an arguer proves that cutting NEA financial support for a photographer violates his symbolic speech rights does not mean the debater advocates reinstating the grant or grants in question in this instance. Shadish would argue instead that it would only require that symbolic speech issues would become one factor in the relevant agent's decision making calculus.

CONSISTENCY:

The third superstandard, **consistency**, appears in Vedung (p. 34) and was cited by Brownlee (p. 60). According to Vedung, "the rule of consistency can be divided into two subrules. The first

has to do with the relationship between the claims and their reasons. It holds that inferences from claims to reasons should be derived in a logically valid fashion. The second auxiliary rule has to do with the relationship among claims themselves and among reasons themselves. It says that claims should be consistent with other claims, and reasons with other reasons" (p. 34).

Brownlee addresses this concept in the same way a court examines precedence which is mostly a misapplication of Vedung's position. Vedung is arguing in his second auxiliary rule the construction of claims and reasons not their application. Chisholm offered some insight into this area when he re-examined Mercier's standards of criteriology. "The ultimate reason for believing cannot be merely the subjective state of the thinking subject. A man is aware that he can reflect upon his psychological states in order to control them. Knowing that he has this ability, he does not, so long as he has not made use of it, have the right to be sure" (p. 234).

A consistent test, in the vein, may be **reversibility**, maybe even crude **reciprocity**. Baier felt it was an ultimate principle from which we can derive all the specific prescriptions and proscriptions we need (1966, p. 108). We needn't go that far. Reversibility merely entails "imagin[ing] what it would be like to be on the receiving end of the action" (Myers, 1986, p. 19). If it's right to deny Miranda rights to accused drug dealers, how would you or anyone like to be denied foreknowledge of your right to counsel upon your arrest for DUI?

Second, there is **actuality testing**.

> For any actual language-user we can settle what his criteria are, and whether his are the usual criteria, only by finding out what he **would** say if it were to transpire that such-and-such. Would he retract his statement using the expression? Would he modify or restrict it? (Buck, 1962, p. 201).

Buck insists that the arguer would be obligated to answer "how can" scenario(s) which would deny the criterial calculus. For example, if life is paramount, how can we explain war and capital punishment?

Third, there is a test of **future generations**.

> Persons, as moral agents, are possessed of certain rights which cannot morally be abridged. Since future individuals must be considered persons in the same sense as presently existing individuals, we must consider ourselves to have moral obligations to future individuals in **exactly the same sense** in which we have moral obligations to presently existing individuals. (Surber, 1977, p. 107)

This ethical requisite forces values to extend beyond the present which not only deeply indicts Bogg's social values and exigence standards, but also is the appropriate bedrock of the value objection argument. As a test to evaluate action, B. Curtis suggested that "supererogation begins--and ends--at the point where the cost and risk deliberately incurred by the agent is roughly as

significant as the moral value at the end" (1981, p. 311). While he admits this ratio may be unclear, he firmly believes that "there are some cases where the intentions of mature and level-headed persons are fairly clear" (p. 317). Example: If the right to existence is paramount, may we not create lives without quality by keeping living corpses on life support and a population crisis by cancelling natural checks on overwhelming our planet's carrying capacity? C'est debate.

A fourth approach may rest with Mercier. The claim and reason must be internal. "No reason of rule of truth that is provided by an external authority can serve as an ultimate criterion." He explained in 1928. "For the reflective doubts that are essential to criteriology should be applied to this authority itself. The mind cannot attain to certainty until it has found within itself a sufficient reason for adhering to the testimony of such an authority" (p. 234). No one can qualify a criteria -- no expert can evidence freedom of expression as an imperative natural right without knowing the context in which the authoritative statement is used. Since the expert is not present in the debate, citing the expert as credibility to establish the criteria is not sufficient.

Both Mercier and Vedung offer a process which demands logical method refraining from appeals to authority as elementary characteristics of consistency. In addition, externalizing consistency, like the concept of legal precedence, demeans criteria and, of course, would suffer from the same problems as the relative standards of criteriology previously mentioned.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

In formulating principles about criteria, we will proceed as Aristotle did when he formulated his rules for the syllogism. As particularists in our approach to the problems of the criterion, we will fit our rules to our method--CEDA debating. The purpose of this essay was to stimulate controversy and inquiry into this area, especially the three superstandards of criteria: clarity, substantive belongingness, and consistency.

If there will be a difference between policy or NDT debating and non-policy or CEDA debating, it must be designed bottom-up, and not mandated top-down. The role of the critic in CEDA debate is not the bend young minds into submission by demanding that students kowtow to the judge's likes and peculiarities. We train our students to address that important "universal audience" not to intellectually manipulate the egos of individuals who by happenstance are somewhat older and credentially more expert. Criteria reduces the probability of critic intervention and makes her role more like an informed bystander.

As CEDA debaters speak more quickly, argue examples or illustrations which are plans without plan planks, argue counterplans with standards of competition as a test of sufficient cause, argue necessary causation with intrinsicness presses in the form of hypothetical non-competitive counterplans, and argue disadvantages by calling them value objections or policy

implications, the time is slowly approaching when CEDA will become nearly indistinguishable from NDT debate, and may produce another split. If that is not desirable, the solution rests with what we are debating.

Resolutions of value may help in this regard, and once we feel comfortable with arguing criteria, which may occur once rule setting is re-examined against models of value argumentation, that important transition could be relatively painless.

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