

PARAMETRIC TOPICALITY: AN ANALYSIS AND A REBUTTAL

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THE SETTING: A debater is answering a charge from the negative that her case/plan is insufficient to prove the resolution true. The negative may claim that there is an entire or whole resolution¹ which the affirmative proofs do not sufficiently constitute. Or, the negative may claim that the affirmative proofs are hasty² and inadequate to justify the conclusion that should the affirmative proofs be true then the resolution is also true. The affirmative debater may be tempted to say "my case/plan is the resolution." Her response suggests that after the first affirmative constructive speech, new parameters for the debate appear, consequently there is no whole resolution beyond the affirmative proofs, the affirmative proofs become the substitute resolution. As a result, there is no resolution greater than the affirmative case/plan against which claims of sufficiency can be tested. This is parametric topicality.

Parametric topicality, defining the resolution as the case/plan, gives the affirmative a power of definition far beyond any privilege or right traditionally associated with the initiator of an argument. It is my premise for this criticism that this theoretical development demands a notable burden of proof. A burden of proof which has not been met in extant scholarship.

ORIGINS: The concept of parametric topicality in policy debate can be gleaned from three articles. In 1973, Lichtman et al defending the alternative-justification case in policy debating wrote: "It is not the responsibility of the affirmative to persuade the judge to accept all conceivable interpretations of the debate resolution" (p. 61).³ In 1978, Dolley in discussing an "all-encompassing resolution" concluded differently. He wrote that all-encompassing (sometimes dual-directional) resolutions left "the negative no position to defend, if one accepts the assumption that the negative may not defend a topical position" (p. 8). His premise was that some resolutions may address all truth in some pragmatically known universe, and allowing the negative only non-resolutional positions may be problematical. He concluded that after the affirmative plan was presented, anything not the plan is not resolutional in that given debate. Then, in 1989, he expounded on this and joined with Panetta and straightforwardly defended the thesis that "the negative should have the option of presenting a topical counterplan" (p. 166). For Panetta and Dolley [hereafter

¹ The debate over whole resolution and hasty generalization is over. While Bile (1987) may have inadvertently led readers to assume that he meant that affirmative should debate the entire resolution that was never his intention. Debating the entire resolution is problematical; debating the whole resolution is not. For Bile and others, to debate the whole resolution is consistent with Berube's (1983/1987 & 1989) position that examples may inductively enable the affirmative to make a truth statement about the resolution. Both Bile and Berube suggest that some examples are better than others. For Bile those examples would involve a sufficiently large subset of the resolution. For Berube those examples would need to be both representative and sufficiently large. For a summary of this observation, see Truesdale (1990).

² Unrepresentative and/or insufficiently large subsets of the resolution commit the fallacies of biased statistics known as Type II error or hasty generalization.

³ However, they added the caveat that "the plan represents one of the many proposals that are logically consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the resolution. No affirmative plan ever defines the resolution. . . . To assume that the proposals an affirmative chooses to debate defines the debate resolution is to assume some parts [necessarily] define the whole" (p. 63).

referred to as PD], the topical counterplan, better defined the resolutional counterplan, involved a policy option, not topical by affirmative standards of meaning, yet conceivably topical by other than affirmative standards in the debate instant. PD's proofs for this thesis were "premised on the assumption that policy comparison, and not testing the validity of the resolution, is and should be the accepted practice in debate" (p. 167).

The discussion on resolutional focus in non-policy debate has been examined in Bile's article on whole resolution (1987), Madsen and Chandler's rebuttal (1988), Berube's two articles on hasty generalization (1983/1987, 1989) and many others. CEDA debate has stated its view clearly, the focus of debate in CEDA is the resolution (Walker 1989). These theorists draw heavily from the observations on counter-warrants originally made by Paulsen and Rhodes (1979) and others.⁴

Many of the tired arguments why resolutional focus is unjustified were summarized by PD. They are reviewed and discharged in this essay's conclusion.

This analysis and rebuttal attempts to reinvigorate the debate over resolutional focus. Though using an example(s) to validate a resolution is justified, not any instantiation will do, unless that instantiation is sufficient to evade the fallacies associated with inductive reasoning.

This essay will try to extend Rhodes' 1981 observation that the parametric functions of a debate resolution "seems to have no real current underpinning" (p. 493). While debate theory needs to be tested by examining it against the three criteria of enhancing the quality of debate, enhancing its educational value, and insuring equal ground (Keeshan & Ulrich, p. 174), I feel that a fourth criterion, hinted at by Rhodes, needs to be added: any contribution to debate theory must be logically sound. As such this analysis and rebuttal focuses on PD's article of 1989 for two reasons.

First, their work draws substantially from propositional reasoning, especially the work of Irving Copi. As such they ground their work in logic which provides me a focus for this essay. Debaters have cited predominantly pages 166 and 167 of the PD article to justify parametric topicality. They seem to especially like paragraph 6 on page 166.

It is important to note that the resolution as a concept -- what Copi calls "the propositional function" -- carries no intrinsic truth value standing alone. It is neither true nor false absent a specific substitution instance.

In this context, a substitution instance is "the result of substituting an individual variable (case with or without plan) into the proposition function (resolution)" (p. 305, Copi, 1961 & p. 166, PD, 1989).

Second, PD's work includes a set of overclaims which does not distinguish between policy and non-policy resolutions per se. As such, they have opened the floodgates of misinterpretation. PD claimed in their 1989 article that substitution instances "are not susceptible to the discovery of alternate instances, because such instances are irrelevant" (p. 168). Hence, no counter-warrants and no whole resolution debating. Also, they claim "nor can there be hasty overgeneralization, because no generalization need be made to prove the argument true" (p. 168). Hence, no hasty generalization.

ORGANIZATION: This essay proceeds to three sections: First, existential instantiation (using an example to prove a proposition) as a substitute premise in propositional reasoning will be examined (something PD failed to do). Second, the utility of existential instantiation in establishing meaning will be examined. Third, the application of existential instantiation to debate, and specifically non-policy debate will be tested.

SECTION ONE: EXISTENTIAL INSTANTIATION RE-EXAMINED.

⁴ See Rhodes (1981), Mayer (1982), Simons (1984), Rhodes & Pfau (1985), Tolbert & Hunt (1985/1987), Rhodes & White (1986), Adams & Wilkins (1987) McGee (1988) and Rhodes (1988).

Since Copi addresses existential instantiation in propositional reasoning, we begin there. When Popper wrestled with induction, a system of logic which can never be valid in absolute terms (the argument of skeptics), he redefined the method in propositional reasoning.

Propositional reasoning involves the use of rules of inference, but instead of having the probative force to verify, it can only falsify. Falsification can be achieved by deduction (ex: existential instantiation). I can never absolutely prove the statement (All swans are white) to be true, but I only need to observe one black swan to prove that it is false" (p. 3, Evans, 1982).

Rules of inference in propositional reasoning, true to Popper's conception of proof and falsifiability, are as follows:

- (i) Assume the negative of what you wish to prove.
 - (ii) Deduce a logical contradiction.
 - (iii) Infer that your starting assumption is false.
- (p. 116, Evans, 1982)

There are no equivalencies between what is demanded by rules of inference in propositional reasoning and what happens on the affirmative in debate, at least not like PD intended. Recall, initially, that propositional reasoning in debate would begin with an affirmative assuming the negation of the resolution. If the affirmative attempted to insert some modifier to create the aresolution and then offered an existential instantiation which denied the aresolution, the only conclusion the affirmative could draw would be that the aresolution is false for the existential instantiation, but that doesn't say anything about the resolution per se unless we are proving a resolution true via example, inductively, a process which PD denies. Though PD claimed that "the resolution . . . is neither true or false, absent a specific substantive instance" (p. 166), it would remain so even after existential instantiation by the affirmative if we are forced to follow rules of inference but denied inductive reasoning.

PD misapplied Copi's scholarship. The illustration they drew from Copi is not justified. They commit the fallacy of composition.

They argued: "the plan would be what Copi defined as a substitution instance" (p. 166). For the premise "All humans are mortal," a substitution instance would allow the conclusion: "Socrates is mortal." A substitution instance is "the result of substituting an individual constant for the individual variable in that propositional function" (p. 305, Copi, 1961). In this example, it is "Socrates" for "All humans."

First, the subject term Socrates must meet the meaning of the subject term, all humans, in the propositional function. Cocker spaniels and kiwi fruit as instantiations will not do. How to test whether a subject term is a substitute instance and meets the meaning of the subject term in the propositional function is mostly done observationally, either intuitively or inductively. Second, a substitute instance does not enable the logician to conclude that should Socrates be human, that all humans are mortals. Rather, as we know all too well, it only allows the conclusion that Socrates is mortal. This would mean that if the case/plan was a substitute instance, the only conclusion which can be drawn merely distances the case/plan from the resolution.

This is all highly problematical. PD wrote: "by presenting a specific proposal in the form of a plan, the affirmative attempts to prove the resolution true by documenting the desirability of a specific topical instance" (p. 166). If the justification for this practice has something to do with the intrinsic failure of the resolution to embody truth, how can this misinterpretation of singular propositional logic compensate for this deficiency?

Though PD attempt to draw a parallel between tests of existential instantiation and topicality in debate, that parallel is weak. They cite Copi who wrote that "a propositional function will have some true substitution instances and some false substitution instances" (p. 305, Copi, 1961 & p. 166, PD, 1989). They interpret this to mean that "a plan must be topical to be a substitution instance" (p. 166). However, PD left what constituted a topical substitution instance up for grabs, a problem I tackle in detail later.

Nevertheless, it is my premise that PD's definition of topicality in substitution logic should not be interpreted as black/white.

Though PD believed that "a true substitution instance must be topical and satisfy the requirements of the ubiquitous resolutional term should" (p. 166), for Copi, a true substitution term should conform to "ordinary grammar and traditional logic" (p. 303, 1961). In singular propositional logic, a substitute subject term, PD's vision of the plan or non-policy case, would need to satisfy the meaning of the subject term in the propositional function, PD's resolution, for which it is being substituted. For me, the meaning in this setting would be a function of **representativeness** as a deeper test of topicality.

PD wrote that "a false substitution instance would be a topical plan that ought not to be adopted" (p. 166) much like a counter warrant. Here, PD commit the fallacy of small sample themselves. While their statement is correct, false substitutions not only occur when the substitute subject term fails the predicate function, PD's ubiquitous should, but also when the substitute subject term itself is unclear, not clearly discernible from the propositional function. Even in my previous example, Lieut. Commander Data and Australopithecus are arguably substitute subject terms for humans, but their quality is a function of resemblance. False substitution terms are not as clear as air bags versus food assistance. Rather, fine and precise tests are used in analyzing substitute subject terms. Even if PD insist on calling it topicality, it is not much different from **representativeness**. PD confuse topicality and representativeness. If a single affirmative instance is equated with the domain of the entire resolution, then there is no context in which the substitute term(s) can be evaluated. It begs the question of topicality.

If existential instantiation is not justified for the affirmative, is it also unjustified for the negative? PD argued that the "counter-resolutional counterplan is an argument with its own set of problems" (p. 171), and references Keeshan and Ulrich's (1980) and Ganer's (1981) reservations about counter warrants. If we presume these indictments on counter-resolutional counterplans and counter-warrants valid, then the option of existential instantiation is foreclosed for the negative as well as the affirmative. In this situation, PD are tautologic. Popper, Kaplan, Dubin, etc. hold that a proof must be capable of "disconfirmation." If PD wish to make their case that existential instantiation is valid for affirming the resolution, they cannot simultaneously reject the same option for the negative especially since existential instantiation is premised on falsifiability not verification.

But the negative can use existential instantiation to falsify the resolution. For purposes of the following, I will assume (1) the resolution is a propositional function and (2) deduction is appropriate for analyzing the logical structure of natural language arguments [both of which I reject unequivocally later]. Using Evans' standards, the negative (i) assumes the resolution rather than their traditional aresolution, (ii) deduces a logical contradiction, an existential instantiation, something like a counter-resolutional counterplan or even a counter-warrant and (iii) infers the resolution is false. Unlike PD, I visualize a system which allows the negative and the affirmative to use existential instantiation, but that system is not substitutive per se, but instead must meet the obligations of valid inductive reasoning.

My final argument regarding PD's foray into propositional logic is that the resolution is not a proposition, but PD treat it as such. "A proposition is a statement with truth value [and] in standard logic only two values are permitted: true and false" (p. 115, Evans, 1982). PD, however, claim that "the resolution . . . carries no intrinsic truth value standing alone" (p. 166). Being the case, it must then be false. Deducing from a false premise may yield a valid argument, but the conclusion will be false. Accordingly, "a false substitution instance . . . ought not to be adopted" (p. 166, PD). In debate, it ought to be rejected. If the resolution is not a proposition, then, maybe, propositional reasoning, which is deductive, cannot be assumed appropriate to analyze the logical structure of natural language arguments of the sort we find in debate.

SECTION TWO: EXISTENTIAL INSTANTIATION AND MEANING.
This section examines logical meaning and language meaning.

LOGICAL MEANING: PD believed that the resolution as a concept "carries no intrinsic truth value standing alone" (p. 166). They never defined truth in that statement. Debate truth is a special type of truth. It is neither essential or intrinsic, it is relative or corresponding.⁵ Though Copi's view of truth is unstated, it can be discerned from his writing. Copi wrote that "validity depends upon the ways in which simple statements are truth-functionally combined into compound statements" (p. 302, 1961) which reads like the correspondence view of truth.

When Copi introduced singular propositions in his textbook, he did so with the statement: "There are, however, other types of arguments to which the validity criteria of the two preceding chapters (symbolic logic and extended arguments) do not apply" (p. 302, 1961), but he, and others like him, never assumed that substitute instances were a prerequisite for establishing a propositional function true.

Issues relating to validity tests for propositional functions are germane to this discussion of meaning. In noncompound propositional functions, the simplest of which are singular propositions, according to Copi, "validity depends rather upon the inner logical structure of the noncompound statements involved" (p. 303, 1961). Copi classified the pertinent tests of validity into two groups: universal instantiation and generalization (UI & UG) and existential instantiation and generalization (EI & EG).

UI and UG, as tests of singular propositions, are rejected by PD's interpretation. UI means that "any substitute instance of a propositional function can validly be inferred from its universal quantification" (pp. 315-16). However, since PD deny a universal quantifier for the propositional statement, their resolution, this test is irrelevant.

UG means "since any substitution is true, all substitution instances are true, and hence the universal generalization of that propositional function is

⁵ In discussing truth, we have generally embraced two theories. The coherence theory of truth defines TRUTH. That is a statement is true or false if "it coheres or fails to cohere with a system of other statements; that it is a member of a system whose elements are related to each other by ties of logical implication as the elements of pure mathematics are related" (p. 130, White, 1967). This deductive system is very inappropriate to debate. For example, Hallett observed the following: "Word meanings are not true or false, accurate or inaccurate. . . ; "Employing words in their established senses does not by itself guarantee truth. . . ; [and] Words can be used with identical senses to assert or deny the same theory" (p. 122, 1988).

A second correspondence theory of truth is closer to what we do in debate. It sets the view that "truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact" (p. 238, Pryor, 1967). Linguistic, and, in this case, rhetorical truth is consistent with Hallett's principle of relative similarity.

(F)or a statement of fact, or informative utterance, to be true, it suffices that its use of terms resemble more closely the established uses of those terms than it does those of rival, incompatible terms. (p. 91, 1988)

This interpretation seems sufficient given that it describes the use of extended arguments and documentation in debate, and that in assigning truth value to the resolution, the act has no significance or impact beyond itself: nothing changes, it is a performative act only. As Kincade wrote, "truth functions in speech rather like a nod of the head in gesture" (p. 394, 1958). Ezorsky agreed.

"The question 'What does it mean to say that a statement is true?' seems properly answered by 'Just what the statement means and nothing more' [M]y pronouncement that a move is correct or an act legal does not imply that I made the move or performed the act. (p. 114, 1963)

true also" (p. 318). For Copi, the any substitution instance would be a singular instance chosen from all substitution instances which possess a certain property sufficient when combined with the predicate term to enable us to accept the conclusion. The property must be definitional such that the substitute instance defines the propositional function. Copi gave us the following example.

A geometer, seeking to prove that all triangles possess a certain property, may begin with the words: "Let ABC be any arbitrarily selected triangle." Then the geometer begins to reason about the triangle ABC, and establishes that it has the property in question. From this he concludes that all triangles have that property. Now what justifies his final conclusion? Granted of the triangle ABC that it has the property, why doesn't it follow that all triangles do? (p. 317)

The problem for PD is that defining their any substitute instance challenges the coexistence of the resolution. PD obliterate the propositional function as soon as the substitute instance is made. As such, UG is another moot proof of validity for their purpose.

Let's consider the remaining two proofs of validity: EI and EG. The wisdom that an existential quantifier can be assumed where none exist is discussed later, but it remains a prerequisite to this entire discussion. We, therefore, momentarily throw caution to the wind and assume, for the moment, that when a resolution is unquantified, an existential quantifier should be included.

EI is "the principle that from the existential quantification of a propositional function we may infer the truth of its constant" (pp. 320-21, Copi, 1961). This means, if the proposition reads for a or any x, we get y, then the truth of x . . . x can be inferred from the proposition. EG works the other way and reads that "Since the existential quantification of a propositional function is true if and only if it has a least one true instance, from any true substitution instance of a propositional function we may validly infer its existential quantification" (p. 321, Copi, 1961). Evidently, EG is the principle test embraced by PD.

EG means: if I substitute "graduate schools in economics" for "US higher education" in the 1983 CEDA topic on sacrificing quality for institutional survival, the first step must be to insert an existential quantifier. In addition to Madsen & Chandler's reservations regarding "fill-in" the "missing modifier" (pp. 33-34, 1988), (arguments yet to be refuted,) my view, evidenced in detail later, is that ambiguity caused by the absence of an explicit quantifier does not justify existentially instantive "fill-ins." Furthermore, if any "fill-ins" occur, a universal quantifier is presumptive.

As a result, whoever inserts an existential quantifier accepts a burden of proof which can only be met when we examine the understanding/knowledge character of the original propositional function. In debating, we have hasty generalization which is premised on improving the level of understanding the resolution. While PD's assertion that specificity increases thoroughness may be true for the substitute instance, it ignores hasty generalization and resolutional focus.

Absent a justification of the "fill-in" quantifier by the side making the instantiation, EI and EG can only lead to the observation that existential instantiation can never prove anything but itself true unless the propositional function from which it was drawn is written and understood as existentially quantified.

PD foresaw this universality conundrum, and they argued: "(n)ot every resolution is universally qualified. Many exist which are existentially quantified" (p. 167). As an example, they use a resolution engaging the indefinite article, a, which, of course, is existentially quantified. Then, to what the devious appetites of some of their readers, they suggest that should we assume all resolutions are existentially quantified, then inductive overgeneralization is evaded. For resolutions, involving some, many, or even a(n) as quantifiers, they are absolutely correct, but those are not prevalent in debate.

PD dubbed resolutions without explicit quantifiers: "propositional statements suffer (ing) from suppressed quantification" (p. 168). They further suggested that a particular quantifier, such as a or one, must be preferred over

a universal, or near-universal quantifier, such as all or most. Then, they forewarned us that "confusing universal and particular quantities [not qualities, misprint in PD] in an argument or inference" (p. 233, Angeles, 1981, & p. 168, PD, 1989) risks the quantifier shift fallacy. Why this problem doesn't apply to assuming a non-universal but does when you assume a universal or near-universal quantifier is never explained by them.

Earlier in PD's article, they wrote that "academic debate theory has not thus far directly addressed the question of resolutorial quantification" (p. 167). First, I suggest they read some of the scholarship in non-policy debate which has begun to do just that.⁶ Regardless, that hardly excuses them from the assertion that a case/plan examining a minority, if not a minutiae, of a resolution is logically justified. Nowhere do PD give reasons why the focus of debate should not be on all, or at least, most of the resolution beyond the belabored dilemma about poorly worded resolutions embodying contradictory instances, the dual-directional resolution, an issue examined in this essay's conclusion.

PD worked from the premise when in doubt about the quantifier in a resolution, instantiate. However, there is at least one rule in quantification: "To make sense of quantification, the variables have to keep their references as we pass from the actual world to another which is physically possible" (Follesdal, 1971, p. 58), hence the first problem: instantiation reduces the range of the predicate function in the resolution. Example: for the topic, poverty threatens political stability, once some is added before poverty or among African Americans inserted after poverty, political stability acquires a very specific context which may substantially alter the range of issues relevant to a discussion about political stability.

When confronted by 'suppressed quantification' universal quantification is always preferred when attempting to secure knowledge. "To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing" (Kant, 1934, p. 99). Regarding quantities, Kant left his viewpoint unambiguous. "If, on the other hand, we compare a singular with a universal judgment, merely as knowledge, in respect to quantity, the singular stands to the universal entity as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different from the universal" (p. 70, 1934). In categorial logic, universal quantification enables us to understand the interrelatedness of our environment. Studying all or none explains to us the material causes of things. That was one of Aristotle's arguments in *Metaphisica*.

Since, instantiations drawn from a word(s) in the resolution, are merely subsets of the universal and, additionally, fail, by agreement via parametric definition, to stray outside of the universal, then interrelatedness is clearly less evident to the instantiator while it may be unavoidable to the universalizer.

Finally, the quantifier may not be unintentionally suppressed in resolutions; it is naive to assume the framers are without purpose when leaving off a quantifier. Turbayne, in discussing metaphors, wrote: "Some things -- very different this time -- get the same name because, although they have very few things in common, either they may have a special likeness that someone is interested in or someone is interested in creating the likeness" (p. 76, 1962). Maybe, the ambiguous term was chosen for its ambiguity.

In debate, we are not searching for ultimate answers. The context must set the methodology. "Given the purpose for which we embark on [an explanation] and the kind of inquiry that is in question, our request, for further explanation will become pointless beyond a certain point, and the information they call for will cease to contribute to the understanding we all are seeking" (p. 78, Dilman, 1973).

⁶ See Berube (1983/1987), Biggers (1985), Bile (1987), Madsen & Chandler (1988), & Berube (1989).

LANGUAGE MEANING: PD's theory deserves to be rejected on a semantic level as well for existential instantiation in natural language arguments is meaningless.

First, existential instantiation is not implicitly meaningful: it teaches us little about the term being instantiated. By labelling a young man Amos and studying Amos does not give us the full meaning of man-ness. Furthermore, this process would only enable people who have met Amos to know what man-ness means. Instantiation and indication simply do not constitute meaning. "If the definition explains the meaning of a word, surely it can't be essential that you should have heard the word before" (p. 2, Wittgenstein, 1969). Indeed, parametric definition necessitates illustration in terms of an existential instantiation. That explains nothing. "As soon as you think of replacing the mental image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life to the sentence at all" (p. 5, Wittgenstein, 1969).

Identity theory says that "interchangeability is the linguistic correlate of identity" (p. 41, Wilson, 1959). In discussing the necessity of a definition of language, Wilson differentiated language from non-language and developed criteria of adequacy, one of which maintains that a language can only be identical to itself if and only if "each expression of [its] common vocabulary has the same significance" (p. 20, 1959). English is English when two speakers of English can meet and say 'military intervention' and understand the concept as it relates to the beaches of Grenada, the skies over Baghdad, and the streets of Panama City. Instantiation denies this level of knowing and simply threatens language as effective communication since it de facto raises private meaning to the status of public meaning.

Don't we learn through illustration? Yes, but the process is much thicker. Consider a young father, Alfred, walking with his child, Sarah, in a city park. Sarah stops, bends down, and picks up a maple leaf. Alfred says: "That is a leaf." A few moments later, Sarah picks up a second leaf, an oak leaf. Alfred says: "That is a leaf." Sarah looks up to Alfred, looks back at both leaves in his hands and says: "leaf." What Sarah learned is the understanding of the general term, leaf. The particular leaves were only "a means to the end of producing 'in him' an idea which we imagine to be some kind of general image . . . we are inclined to think that the general idea of a leaf is something like a visual image, but one which only contains what is common to all leaves" (p. 18, Wittgenstein, 1969) within that context. If Alfred pointed to a page of a book discarded on the ground flipping in the breeze and said: "leaf", if he pointed to a thin sheet of metal and said: "leaf", if he pointed to a hinged table top in a shop window and said: "leaf", or if he pointed to a discarded metal strip which was once part of a leaf spring and said: "leaf", the commonality necessary for establishing meaning of "leaf" as an organic thing is obfuscated, and Sarah is confused.

This is metaphorical reasoning, a particularly inductive process, but if this process of discerning commonalities is to minimize error, any leaf will not do as any singular instantiation will not do. Copi's use of singular does not mean any are all equal or minimally sufficient. A singular proposition "asserts that a particular individual possessed a specified property" (p. 303, Copi, 1961). But, Copi goes on to write that "it is clear that one and the same subject term can occur in different singular propositions. . . . It is also clear that one and the same predicate terms can occur in different singular propositions" (p. 303, 1961). This being the case, we need to find instantiations that are near archetypal or at least representative, and to test that status, we again are forced to return to representativeness.

Failure to do so results in what I wish to call the fallacy of properage. Parametric definitions of a resolution are connected with the idea that the meaning of a word, phrase, clause, or sentence is an image, or a thing, a case with or without a per se plan, connected to the word or sentence. This roughly means we are looking at words or sentences as though they all were proper names or things, and we thus confuse the bearer of the name with the meaning of the name (see p. 18, Wittgenstein, 1969). On a very simple level, conventional English differentiates proper from non-proper names by capitalizing the first

letter of proper names. This procedure is used to minimize confusion. Parametric definition nullifies this convention and is unacceptable.

Second, existential instantiation is not explicitly meaningful: it teaches us little about our language. Using a substitute instance to assign meaning to a resolution denies the function of topicality. Topicality in debate exists to test a proof to determine its pertinence. That test, in all forms, answers the question: Does the resolution mean the affirmative claim? My concern is that existential instantiation does not provide sufficient meaning to answer this question. Wittgenstein held that the proper way of understanding and resolving philosophical problems lies in arriving at a correct conception of language (p. xi, McGinn, 1984). McGinn took this view one step further. "We need to be clear about the nature of meaning before we can hope to clear about anything else" (p. xi, 1984).

Wittgenstein defined what meaning is not. In Philosophical Investigations, he wrote:

Meaning is as little an experience as intending.

But what distinguishes an experience as intending? --- They have no experience - content.

For the contents (images for instance) which accompany and illustrate them are not the meaning or intending (p. 217e, 1953).

Wittgenstein gave three reasons: first, understanding is a dispositional and not an occurrent condition of a person; second, a great variety of images may accompany understanding a particular word, either for the same person on different occasions or for different people, and, third, there is no logical route from the intrinsic properties of an image to the meaning of the associated word (see pp. 5-7, McGinn, 1984).

When debaters use existential instantiation to indicate the resolution, they overclaim the function of indicators or metaphors as tools of meaning. "Indicators indicate what they indicate because an empirical correlation holds between their occurrence and the occurrence of the thing, fact, event, feature . . . indicated" (p. 5, von Savigny, 1988). If PD viewed the relationship between the resolution and the instantiation as unidirectionally from resolution to instantiation, they can only claim that the instative proof is valid of and for the instantiation, as was discussed in the previous section. However, this thesis is somewhat at odds with their statement (p. 166) that instantiation may function to prove resolutions true, for when the relationship between a resolution and an instantiation can be probatively bi-directional, they not only tempt induction, which PD reject, but also, as an indicator, the instantiation would need to meet some fundamental burdens, like representativeness.

For example, "an indicator cannot be used to indicate something unless it is discovered beforehand that it indicates the thing indicated" (p. 5, von Savigny, 1988). This would suggest that the relevance of an instantiation must be established a priori, and "discovering what indicators indicate means discovering the empirical correlations between the indicator and the thing indicated" (p. 5, von Savigny, 1988). How such a relationship can be established was examined by von Savigny.

The degree of reliability depends on the form of the empirical correlation; the indicator is more reliable the higher the statistical probability of the thing indicated relative to the indicator. (p. 6)

This brings us fully around to the rules of biased sample and biased statistics and back to hasty generalization unless PD have discovered a new methodology which they've yet to reveal.

SECTION THREE: EXISTENTIAL INSTANTIATION IS INAPPLICABLE TO DEBATE.

First, if the focus in debate in the resolution and examples or instantiations are used then debate is inductive but existential instantiation is drawn from a deductive system. Debate is not deductive, but existential instantiation in propositional reasoning is. The methodology is inapplicable. The inductive method in debate has been defended elsewhere, most recently in non-

policy debate scholarship (see Berube 1983/1987, 1989 & McGee 1988) and their works will not be re-examined here.

PD reject inductive methodology. As previously indicated, we do not search for absolute truth in debate, and PD's and others' fixation with inductive skepticism must stop. "We constantly draw inferences and act on them. This kind of inference permeates all our empirical knowledge, all our actions, decisions and intentions" (p. 30, Dilman, 1973). As we will see later, it is through induction that subjunctive generalizations, policy resolutions, are fashioned. Stove put it clearest: "Skepticism about induction . . . stems from a certain feeling: a diffused or 'cosmic' feeling of insecurity" (p. 106, 1986).

Second, policy and non-policy resolutions are sufficiently different such that PD's conclusions regarding resolutions in policy debate have no analogue enabling the affirmative parametric definition in non-policy debate.

Theorists, including Matlon (1978), Zarefsky (1980), Warnick (1981) and, currently, Church and Wilbanks (1986), have gone through much trouble categorizing resolutions as policy, value, and fact, and all they seem to have managed to do has been to (1) make statements about presumption and burden of proof about which consensus still does not exist, and (2) further subcategorized resolutions without deeply distinguishing their most fundamental difference: their mood.

What is mood? Mood "refers to verbal inflections or to syntactic contrasts that (1) denote by formal opposition the relations between one verb in the sentence and another verb structure, and (2) express a notional contrast that supposedly indicate the attitude of the speaker or writer toward the action or state of affairs expressed by the verb" (pp. 12-13, Harsh, 1968). In English, we utilize three moods, and we utilize each one "depending on whether the speaker or writer considers a syntactic structure as stating a fact (indicative mood), as a command (imperative mood), or as expressing non-fact or modification of fact (subjunctive mood)" (p. 13, Harsh, 1968). We do not debate imperative statements per se, so the following examines the differences between the indicative

⁷ At this point, two additional arguments about induction seem justified.

First, induction makes knowledge; deduction does not. "(I)n induction, our reasoning takes us beyond what we already know, it widens our knowledge. We can thus move from what we see to what we do not at the time see" (p. 29, Dilman, 1973). This is the working philosophy behind intercollegiate debating: it's why we change topics annually or semi-annually, and it's why PD feel that increased specificity, variety in new ideas, increases thoroughness (p. 170). In comparison, Stove wrote that "after 2500 years of hoping and searching . . . it can hardly be said that formal logic has been rich in positive results. . . . We didn't get where we are today by adopting . . . the stone age philosophy of 'cases rule'" (p. 131, 1986).

Second, induction cannot be more fallible than deduction because the premise to premise to conclusion leap in a traditional syllogism is non-deductively validated.

(A philosopher) must either embrace inductive skepticism, or abandon deductivism. He must, that is, either affirm that a proposition about the observed is never a reason to believe a proposition about the unobserved; or he must admit that one proposition can be a reason to believe another, with the inference from the one to the other being valid ('deductive'). As the former alternative is scarcely compatible with sanity, most philosophers have sensibly preferred the latter. That is, they have abandoned deductivism, even if they have done so, in most cases, neither very consciously nor very enthusiastically. But to abandon deductivism is to acknowledge the existence of non-deductive logic. (pp. 132-33, Dilman, 1973)

Assuming that any rival to deductivism must be a formal system, philosophers have searched for rules, rules they cannot find; since induction is based purely on confirmation, the same force which makes inferences from one deductive premise to another on to a conclusion a sensible exercise in reasoning.

(statement of fact and opinion) and the subjunctive (statement expressing a non-fact; what ought or ought not to be).

Policy resolutions, with or without that ubiquitous *should*, are written in the subjunctive while most non-policy resolutions appear in the indicative. When that does not seem to occur, it is because sentence structure has been misshapened and upon its rewriting easily conforms to subjunctive form. Poutsma, in his discussion of modal categories in the subjunctive pattern, listed the auxiliaries "may, might, should, will, and would" (pp. 13, 116-202, 1926) as used in forming the subjunctive. Notice the ubiquitous *should*.

First, policy resolutions subsume non-policy resolution. Policy resolutions are also much broader and encompass far more instantiations than non-policy resolutions. James found it difficult to analyze subjunctive conditionals because its range "seems to overlap . . . with uses of the indicative" (p. 6, 1986). He also discovered that the subjunctive had no temporal significance (p. 7). Semanticists define the subjunctive and its use as intentionally ambiguous "which accounts for its many uses" (pp. 10-11, James, 1986). Since the claims made in indicative generalizations can be subsumed into the subjunctive universe of possibilities, the non-policy debater's job is more manageable by orders of magnitude.

Second, subjunctive generalizations are ambiguous by nature, they can entail dual-directional instantiations. Indicative generalizations, short of misinterpretation, do not. A fact or an opinion, by definition, cannot be dual-directional. Facts are consensually sanctioned realities. When two facts collide, they lose their factness and become beliefs. Statements of opinion are a bit trickier. Nonetheless, opinion which competes with itself only does so when certain additional/substitute variables interfere with the propositional function described in the indicative generalization.

Third, and here is the best argument for PD's theory. According to John Pollock, subjunctive conditionals, if absent a quantifier, should not be examined universally. Yes, that's correct: *should* not. Pollock has examined this thesis and concluded that "the attempt to analyze subjunctive generalizations . . . as universally quantified subjunctive conditionals is essentially bankrupt" (p. 48, 1976); he claimed this to be true because a strict finding of truth for a subjunctive conditional might encourage the discoverer to consider even physically impossible objects or situations. For the topic, a **socialist form of government should be adopted**, an instantiation could be built with a hypothetical model premised on unrealistic assumptions: total accord on what socialism means, complete disempowerment of capitalist structures, the infallibility of centrally planned economies, etc.

However, Pollock's findings are suspect. His conclusions are highly modified by context: his illustrations are drawn from the natural sciences. His examples do not examine the problematic structures of natural language arguments. Though subjunctive conditionals should not be universally quantified does not mean they *should*, in turn, be all existentially quantified as one or any. Despite these reservations, Pollock's work is due a much deeper examination in resolving this issue than given here.

While Pollock's argument seems to support PD's thesis, consider in conclusion here that he wrote: subjunctive generalizations "start by confirming a number of generalizations inductively" (p. 49, Pollock, 1976). Oops! They are aggregated as a corpus of facts and opinion sufficient to suggest a conditional statement. Hence, we get a subjunctive generalization inductively. So, while Pollock believes universalizing a subjunctive conditional may be senseless, he would not find much solace in a process like PD's instantiation which is drawn from a deductive method in analyzing a conditional which was constructed inductively.

In contrast, non-policy resolutions are distinctively different not only because they precede policy resolutions, but also because if Pollock's argument makes any sense, then subjunctive generalizations are built from instantiations. This would suggest that indicative generalizations are already instantiations: if they are treated as universal instantiations, then they would need to be examined as a totality, but if they are, instead, treated as existential

instantiations, then applying PD's theory to justify further instantiations threatens the Derridaen nightmare, an infinite regression.

CONCLUSION

We can debate resolutions using instantiations, but the instantiations must meet fundamental tests which help us evade inductive fallacies. Parametric topicality is designed to freeze the negative out of the debate. Arguments justifying non-resolutional focus were aptly summarized by PD. These arguments, drawn from debate practice, are misplaced.

PD assume that resolutions cannot be the focus of debates, and commit a gross misunderstanding of sorts by presuming that all of the resolution would need to be defended by the affirmative in order for the resolution to remain the focus of debate. That simply is not the case: we assert truth in situations absent 100% probability [see Berube, 1989]. However, granting them this assumption, they found it necessary to engage existential instantiation as the means to resolve the shortcomings of composing resolutions. This conclusion would be justified if and only if the solution for problematical resolutions would lie outside their composition, but that also cannot be the case. PD feel "most resolutions are so broad that affirming them in their entirety is of little value" (p. 169). They feel that existential instantiation "is preferable to debating general resolutions" (p. 170). Further, they asserted that "the more specific the [instantiation], the more thoroughly its desirability is assessed" (p. 170). Finally, they suggested that "the imposition of an arbitrary set of standards to assess its validity has very little real world application" (p. 169).

This argument fails for at least three reasons. First, by granting that **most** rather than all resolutions are overly broad bespeaks to composing more limiting resolutions, obviously a task which has been accomplished on some occasions. This is an especially compelling conclusion to draw if we grant PD their conclusion that increased specificity increases thoroughness.

Second, no rationale is given why infinitely regressive specificity increases thoroughness. For that matter, overlimiting instantiations may sacrifice thoroughness for triviality such that postulates repeated over and over again approach the status of axioms for little if any reason but their incessant repetition. Witness the spring CEDA handgun resolution. If specificity can be kept from becoming infinitely regressive in their argument, then where should we reach a barrier and how?

This brings me to a third objection. PD asserted that imposing a set of standards, such as tests of hasty generalization is arbitrary. But why? [See Berube, 1989 for a discussion of standards of representativeness]. If PD believed these standards, and others preceding and incorporated in them are arbitrary, then they should at least have rebutted them directly. Furthermore, PD asserted that standards of this sort have little real world application, but failed to consider that these standards were drawn from the experimental method in science. If there is little real world application in drawing from the scientific method of Francis Bacon et al, maybe their real world needs further examination because it is not the world shared by their peers.

PD next argued that some resolutions embody dual-directionality. Now, while this indictment may apply to some policy resolutions, it does not seem to relate to non-policy resolutions which claim a subject-predicate relationship which articulates an effect rather than suggesting an effectuation.

PD, furthermore, indict non-directional resolutions, whatever they may happen to be. However, there is no reason why the only option is between dual-directional and non-directional resolutions; the alternative of uni-directional ones remains.

They finally added that resolutional advocacy decreases the need of precise language since in policy debates, affirmatives may replan as necessary to evade objections regarding flawed plans. Why this practice, one I choose not to defend here, does not improve our understanding of a resolution is never addressed by PD, a burden their argument demands. Beyond their featureless claim that it "would destroy the real value of debate" (p. 172), a value they seem to believe

is akin to a compulsive trek into triviality, PD offer no rationale why discussing features should be preferred over discussing issues.

Next, when PD described case/plan selection as sometimes devious, they suggest that ill-wording may not be intrinsic to improperly worded resolutions at all, but rather to any resolution when the debaters are devious. Of course, if ill-wording has been peculiar to resolutions in the past, the solution is to improve the employment of more precise language in the composing process. If that is not possible, then PD needed to make that case which they did not.

Lastly, PD rejected resolutorial analysis because it encourages counter-warrants and counter-resolutorial counterplans, the logic of which was examined earlier in this essay.

Bile wrote way back in 1987 that "parametric focus makes (obscure examples) theoretically sound" (p. 8). We know that is true. What we do not need is a theory to justify a practice for the mere sake of its justification. It is my conclusion that parametric topicality has no sound theoretical basis.

The affirmative cannot be empowered to reshape the reality of a resolution. The affirmative may be assigned the privilege of interpretation, but that privilege is not imprimatur-ial, and to deny the negative the probative opportunity to test an affirmative interpretation against the original text of the resolution is senseless. That opportunity becomes severely restricted when the affirmative begins adding existential quantifiers to a topic which in turn forecloses any comparisons of an affirmative instantiation to its source.

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THE IMPACT OF PARADIGM CONSISTENCY ON
TAXONOMIC BOUNDARIES IN CEDA DEBATE¹

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The advent of judge philosophy statements in academic debate is predicated upon the assumption that debate critics would formulate their decision criteria by articulating them beforehand. This also would afford debaters an opportunity to adapt to their critics' expressed preferences. While a number of surveys have evaluated critics' paradigm preferences in NDT (Cox 1974; Cross & Matlon 1978; Thomas 1977) and in CEDA (Buckley 1983; Lee, Lee & Seeger 1983), these surveys have not established whether expressed preferences actually are used when judging debates. Judging philosophies and survey responses may be taken as "ought" statements; statement by critics of how they believe they "would" evaluate a debate. However, unless confirmed by decision criteria actually employed in debate rounds, philosophies may fail to represent meaningful differences in judges' preferences to which debaters can adapt. Without such confirmation, the utility of judge philosophy statements in academic debate is open to question.

The present study reports two experiments which address the question of whether judges "do as they say they will." The larger goal of the combined experiments is to discover whether (1) judging paradigms operate meaningfully in CEDA debate and (2) what elements these paradigms contain. The first experiment analyzes the correspondence among critic preferences expressed through judge philosophy statements, responses to a survey instrument, and comments/decision criteria expressed on debate ballots. The second experiment analyzes the consistency between critics' responses to a questionnaire and their performance on the template (top) portion of ballots.

This investigation is justified by the scarcity of research regarding debate critic decision criteria. Early investigations (Cox 1974; Cross & Matlon 1978; Thomas 1977; Buckley 1983; Lee, Lee & Seeger 1983) surveyed critic paradigm preferences through self-report instruments. These surveys were limited to indicating "professed" beliefs since they were not intended to validate the extent to which preferences actually were applied. More recent work by Gaske, Kugler, and Theobald (1985) attempted to discriminate among CEDA judging paradigms, but relied upon unequal (and generally subcritical) cell sizes (61-65). Brey (1989; 1990) has analyzed CEDA philosophy statements to discover the elements of judge preference, but his analysis does not indicate whether paradigm preferences correlate with discernible patterns of judging behavior.[2]

Even less research has focused upon the artifacts of debate evaluation. Bryant (1983) conducted a content analysis of NDT and