

Intuition, Common Sense, and Judgment

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The pedagogical benefits of academic debate are assumed by many Americans, and much evidence confirms this positive impression about debate. Survey data repeatedly reveal that a high percentage of successful business and political "elites" participated in debate in high school and/or college, and many of these elites describe the debate experience positively (Huseman and Goodman; Matlon and Keele; see Simerly). Semlak and Shields' study concludes that students with debate experience have stronger communication skills than students without debate experience. Whatever their limitations, some studies have indicated that debate experience has a positive effect on the development of critical thinking abilities (for example, Colbert; but see Hill). Many law school deans encourage potential law students to participate in academic debate in order to learn critical thinking and communication skills (see Colbert and Biggers).

The alleged benefits of debate experience, however, do not keep some observers of academic debate from expressing dissatisfaction with current debate practice. Beyond a relatively rapid rate of delivery that often seems incomprehensible to the uninitiated (see Weiss), academic debate is associated in some cases with arguments rarely heard in public fora. For example, a newspaper columnist probably would not suggest that a government ban on employee drug testing by businesses might lead to a loss in business confidence, which in turn risks a reduction in investment, followed by a global economic depression and, finally, a nuclear war resulting in the extinction of the human race. Similar arguments, however, are not uncommon at some intercollegiate debate tournaments.

This argument example illustrates the problems faced by the forensic community in evaluating arguments constructed by some academic debaters. Such argumentation disturbs many members of this community, and sometimes this sort of argumentation is described by judges and others as *counterintuitive* or simply defying *common sense*. The problem of evaluative claims made on the basis of "intuition" or "common sense" is our concern in this essay. We consider below a conceptual difficulty with both intellectual and pragmatic implications: What are the problems associated with appeals by debate judges to intuition and/or common sense in making win-loss decisions following an academic debate?

This paper is a statement of our position on an issue important to the forensic community rather than an indictment of the current practice of debate judges. We do *not*

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intend to draw a conclusion regarding some optimal judging *praxis* for CEDA or the larger forensic community. Such a study would require empirical data about current judging practices that are not available to us at this time; available studies (for example, McGee) are not sufficient for such a task. To avoid the accusation of straw argument, however, we suggest that appeals to intuition and/or common sense in academic debate are not uncommon. In addition to manifold references concerning counter-intuitive arguments in CEDA judging philosophies, the "Statement of Objectives and Purposes" suggested for a new debate-sponsoring organization makes mention of intuition and common sense as appropriate standards for judging debates.¹

Briefly, our thesis is that intuition and common sense ought to play minimal roles in forensic adjudication. We agree with Daniel Rohrer's observation that "the ultimate worth of debate lies in . . . its special value to the debater for developing within him [or her] a greater awareness and perhaps a greater sensitivity to differing points of view" (10). The surest way to make certain that debaters are aware of different viewpoints is to make certain that they may be exposed to such alternative viewpoints in debate rounds; this is Rohrer's point in his discussion of debate as a liberal art. Requiring students to question their most basic assumptions will better enable them to defend those assumptions. We suspect that consistent appeals by judges to intuition and/or common sense in justifying their decisions could discourage argument heterogeneity and, as a result, the cultivation of sensitivity to different points of view.² After a short discussion of the intuition and common-sense concepts, we argue that judge rejection of arguments on grounds of intuition and/or common sense is antithetical to the development of critical-thinking skills, a resort to questionable argumentation practice, and an undesirable encouragement of a worrisome variety of judge intervention.

Intuition and Common Sense

A difficulty inherent in discussing intuition- or sense-based argument-evaluation standards for academic debate (or any other activity) is isolating satisfactory definitions of *intuition*, its well-known relation, "*counter-intuitiveness*," and *common sense*. These terms are problematic from a philosophical perspective, given that they have been used in multiple ways in philosophical literature. Despite these variations in use, we believe that appeals to intuition and common sense generally are resistant to the demand that those who invoke the terms provide justifications for claims made on the basis of intuition and/or common sense. As a result, intuition and common sense, as we understand these concepts, have limited conceptual utility for students of philosophy or argumentation.

We believe that discussions of intuition and common sense revolve around two alternate conceptions of these terms. One way of describing these terms privileges *personal* conclusions or beliefs that are the product of individual experience or some universal biological essence. Here, the individual evaluates arguments on the basis of some

non-propositional truth that cannot be derived from other propositions. Alternately, another way of understanding intuition and common sense has revolved around *popular* or communal notions of truth. In this case, individual impressions of general beliefs in a given argument community are used to validate or invalidate claims regardless of the other reasons advanced in support of those claims. Further, a distinction should be made between the *ordinary* use of appeals to intuition or common sense to justify or discredit any of a wide number of cultural practices and the *philosophical* analyses of common sense and intuition that have been common in Occidental scholarship. The remainder of this section focuses on separate discussions of intuition and common sense.

Intuition

Regarding intuition, the most typical definition of intuition, as Rorty tells us, is “*unjustified* true belief not preceded by inference; in this (the commonest sense) ‘an intuition’ means ‘a hunch.’ The existence of hunches is uncontroversial and not of philosophical interest” (204, emphasis added). Note here that personal intuitions, or hunches, are not questionable, “contestable” or “arguable” in the way that we expect judicial decisions to be arguable. One cannot argue that a hunch is inductively weak or deductively invalid. Other, more sophisticated, philosophical discussions of intuition depict intuition as a faculty for apprehension of non-propositional knowledge. Still other theories of intuition imply that intuition is the sum total of an individual’s experience in a community or is externally tested by appealing to the perceptions of community members for confirmation.

In all of these cases, if one provides a (contestable) reason for making a judgment, then one has not made a judgment based on intuition or counter intuitiveness. For example, when an interlocutor requests an explanation of the other’s premise for an argument, the other’s attempt to reply with further substantive explanation signals that the other’s reasons can be *contested*. However, if the other replies that “I just see it that way” or “I think that most people would agree with me,” then the process of giving reasons has come to an end. One who relies on intuition in providing a “reason for [a] decision” is not advancing an argument in the way that we normally expect a debate judge to justify her or his decision-making calculus. Whether in philosophic or popular discourse, reference to intuition announces the end of disputation in one sense, because hunches and indivisible “first truths” all are self-evident to the judge and, hence, are undeniable for her or him. Students might question the intuited claim of the debate judge, but the response of that judge invariably can be “I consider this idea undeniable” or “I just buy that argument.”

At the risk of proclaiming the obvious, arguments should be “arguable,” and intuition, on this basis, seems to be outside the realm of argument, since interlocutors are not able to question the strength or validity of intuited conclusions. At most, intuited knowledge might resemble Aristotelian commonplaces, which are used as foundational premises for building arguments but are not themselves disputed. The internal logic of debate demands that student

advocates advance arguments that may be challenged by their interlocutors, so, as a result, we contend that judges also have the reciprocal burden to advance contestable arguments in explaining the “reason(s)” for their decisions.³ A judge’s announcement that a debater’s arguments are incommensurable with some personal or popular intuition provides no shared frame of reference for further productive disputation (see Brockriede), and the possibility for public disagreement illuminated via argument seems to be at the heart of a relevant debate theory. If judges were willing to set aside their intuitions for decision-making purposes in the first place, then there would be no reason for concern.

Common Sense

Notions of common sense also are problematic. Since the Stoics, many scholars have incorporated common sense (*sensus communis*, *le bons sens*) into their philosophical systems (see Gadamer). Campbell, a well-known eighteenth-century rhetorician, included a discussion of “common sense” in a book chapter on sources of evidence. While definitions of common sense vary considerably from one scholar to another, we suggest that common sense is either a faculty- or a community-based standard of truth that, like intuition, is not arguable. Instead, common sense is the result of conclusions based on a faith in the accuracy of individual sense perceptions, usually when such perceptions are verified by the perceptions of others (that is, members of the community).

Like intuition, common sense is not justifiable via argument or reason giving. Instead, humans simply are endowed with common sense, since “no human creature hath been found originally and totally destitute of it, who is not accounted a monster in his [or her] kind; for such, doubtless, are all idiots and changelings” (Campbell 39-40). In Campbell’s system, which he adapted from Buffier and Reid, common sense provides only knowledge of foundational “first causes” or “first truths” from which all other reasoning is derived (for example, “There are other intelligent beings in the universe besides me”). Alternatively, other theorists (Giambattista Vico, for example) have suggested that common sense is derived from the agreed-upon beliefs of the community. Whether grounded in Campbell’s biological essentialism or Vico’s community consensus, assertions about common sense have been used to validate far more dubious notions than the “first truth” suggested above, while simultaneously precluding the possibility of arguments opposed to those propositions. As Eagleton notes about the ordinary use of common sense, “at different times common sense has dictated burning witches, hanging sheep-stealers and avoiding Jews for fear of fatal infection” (108).

After these descriptions of intuition and common sense, the possible connection between these two ideas deserves explication. Common-sense propositions frequently are founded on intuitions about a community’s sense of the surrounding world. The “truth” of an intuition might be confirmed and become common sensical to the extent that the members of a community agree with one another about this intuition. Intuition may rely more often

na correspondence theory of truth, while common sense may depend typically on a consensus theory of truth. In both cases, however, conclusions based on common sense or intuition resist public justification and critical interrogation because, in each case, either individual apprehension or community consensus relieves the judge (or other rhetor) of the responsibility of defending that conclusion.

Now, let us return to academic debate. If, by claiming that an argument is counter intuitive or antithetical to common sense, one means that members of a given community (for example, "Americans") reject an argument, then it seems that judges would be reduced to guessing at public opinion on an issue, consulting public opinion polls, or, most likely, relying on their own intuited sense of popular or community belief. Alternatively, if by counter intuitive one means that the auditor of the debate (the judge) ought to find a given argument specious because it contradicts personal intuition, then the judge has been invited to impose her or his own intuitions on the debate round in making a decision about the debate. We believe that both sorts of counter intuitiveness and/or common sense are inconsistent with the pedagogic aims of academic debate, as we suggest below.⁴

Before continuing with this discussion, we wish to "pre-empt" a few objections. First, a critic of our position might object that arguments are counter intuitive in many cases because they rely on specious reasoning, overclaimed evidence, minimal risk of harm occurrence, and so on. As a result, the critic might argue, such arguments simply are not intuitive. This is *not*, however, what we think is meant by a claim of counterintuitiveness. If an argument seems to employ specious reasoning or inferior evidence, *those* are the sorts of *reasons* a judge might give for rejecting the argument. Reasons based on undesirable argumentative practices can be critically examined and, as such, are not the subject of our discussion.

Second, some might suggest that we do not mean what others mean by intuition or common sense. However, given that we have not yet found a definition of *intuition*, *counter intuitiveness*, or *common sense* in the literature on academic debate, we are forced to rely here on the casual references to common sense and intuition that are available to us in judging philosophy statements and other such documents.

Third, we do not demand that judges "bracket" (in a phenomenological sense) all their predispositions in favor of some *tabula rasa* judging method, nor should our efforts here be taken as a defense of the *tabula rasa* concept (see note 6). Many judging precepts and paradigms seem consistent with the pedagogical aims of academic debate, and exposure to a variety of judging paradigms and styles may help academic debaters develop audience-adaptation skills. We ask only that judges, whatever their paradigms or theoretical predispositions, avoid decisions based on intuition and/or common sense as we understand those terms. Three justifications for avoiding such decisions are explained below.

Problems with Intuition and Common Sense

Critical Thinking

In preparing citizens to evaluate or participate in public disputation, a key pedagogical advantage of academic debate is its alleged development of critical-thinking skills in student advocates (for example, Colbert). Critical thinking describes a method of decision-making in which we "examine the available evidence and survey accepted motives and values to discover what conclusion may be warranted" (Ehninger and Brockriede 3). The alternative, an uncritical decision-making method, involves the "leap to a conclusion impulsively on the basis of desire, superstition, or prejudice" (Ehninger and Brockriede 3).

In the United States, critical thinking protects the public from the homogeneous messages that politicians and the media often provide. A critically thinking public can test the veracity of what leaders say and can reject messages that do not withstand careful scrutiny. Democracy also requires leaders who think critically. In order to make optimal choices among competing policies, leaders must consider all possibilities and challenge assumptions made by their colleagues. If some alternatives are non-discussible, the consequences may be grave. For example, a better decision-making process, in which all alternatives were discussed and "groupthink" was avoided, might have allowed policy makers of the 1960s to reject the undesirable escalation of American involvement in Vietnam (see Janis).

Academic debate can best maximize training in critical thinking if debaters are allowed to challenge the presuppositions of their opponents, while knowing that judges will not impose those predispositions. Free to challenge all assumptions of their opponents, debaters have the strongest incentive to analyze thoroughly the arguments of those opponents and are encouraged to become more reflective thinkers. Future U.S. leaders should be trained to defend and criticize the arguments to which they are exposed as students. If not, they may be unprepared to defend and criticize the arguments to which they will be exposed during their careers.

In summary, if democracy has value as a means of governing, then exposure to all arguments and careful analysis of these arguments strengthen democratic government. Consistent judge rejection of arguments on the basis of intuition and/or common sense might discourage the pursuit of important or innovative new ideas by debaters.

The Ad Populum Fallacy

A person who objects to an argument because most people do not find that argument pleasing or compelling commits the *argumentum ad populum* informal fallacy. A logically fallacious argument differs from an argument that is merely incorrect; the fallacious argument appears to be valid but fails to meet certain "criteria of soundness" (Eemeren, Grootendorst,

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prejudices about the arguments made by the debaters. Gotcher and Greene explain that "the critic has been viewed as a passive and uncommitted evaluator of arguments with the decision based upon the arguments presented by the two teams" (92). In contrast, making decisions about the value of arguments based on one's prejudices, beliefs, or intuitions, rather than on the arguments of debaters, is one way in which the term "judge intervention" is employed.⁶

We advance three arguments against this variety of judge intervention. First, judge intervention of this sort is undesirable because such intervention is antithetical to the debate process. Bahm notes that "if the judge can introduce argumentation on a ballot, or ignore argumentation in the round, then the central burden on the debater to introduce and refute arguments is proportionately reduced" (19). For example, debaters could become discouraged if judge intuitions consciously were allowed to intervene in the win-loss decision calculus of academic debate. Academic debate pedagogy would be harmed if judge intervention, as understood here, was valorized.

The second objection to this type of judge intervention is that such intervention is unfair to debaters, who cannot be expected to read the minds of judges. As Gass noted:

To a debater, there is no experience more frustrating than to learn upon conclusion of a debate that he or she has been debating a "third team" in the person of the judge seated in the back of the room, a "team" whose arguments were kept secret from him or her during the debate, and whose objections were made known only after the ballot was completed (88).

Students who invest hundreds of hours in research and give up many of their weekends during the school year to participate in debate minimally should be guaranteed that they are not subject to the inarguable intuitions of judges.

A third argument against this sort of judge intervention in debate rounds is that the practice in some cases violates an important communication concept: Words (or signifiers) have no single, unique meaning. This concept, often identified with General Semantics, sometimes is called non-identity (Hayakawa; Korzybski). The simplest way of looking at non-identity is to say that "A is not A." That is, words—symbols with which we designate things—are not those actual things. A room-temperature pail of water in Iowa, to extend Johnson's example, may feel warm to an Alaskan resident, yet feel cool to someone living in Central America. "Warm" and "cool" are merely labels that we attach to things—like pails of water—that we experience. The words themselves have no predetermined, "correct" meaning. Arguing that there is a single, objective measure to determine the water's temperature is to say that we need not be capable of thinking, feeling, or perceiving—that we should not assign meanings based on individual experiences.

Judges who discount arguments because they believe those arguments to be counter intuitive or opposed to common sense violate the General Semantics' concept of non-identity,

Krugier 78). As Bahm argues, "the *ad populum* fallacy appears to have validity due to applied consensus, but lacks validity due to its lack of logical grounding" (3). Simply put, that most persons accept an argument as true does not guarantee that an argument is

Bender notes that "an important lesson of history is the fact that many unpopular and despised opinions eventually gained widespread acceptance. The opinions of Socrates, Aristotle, and Galileo are good examples of this" (9).

One sense of the assertion that a given argument is counter intuitive or opposed to common sense suggests that what the majority believes to be the truth is the truth. Such appeals appeal to the current popularity or unpopularity of a position with a particular audience or a larger community rather than to contestable reasons for accepting or rejecting an argument. This appeal to popularity is problematic, however. History provides numerous examples of beliefs, theories, and dogma that once were accepted as true by the majority of the population but were later rejected as problematic. Consider the following examples: "The earth is flat." "African Americans are subhuman." "Women are less intelligent than men." These were all commonly accepted arguments at one time. However, none of these positions is now considered credible by most U.S. auditors.

Often, perhaps the great majority of the time, the common sense of the majority is "correct" to the extent that it seems to be supported by the better arguments. Sometimes, however, the minority might be correct. Only by allowing the expression of all ideas and providing a fair hearing for such ideas can we select the arguments, whether popular or unpopular, that are better supported. To reject or accept an argument only because of the intuition or common sense of a particular audience—such as debate judges—seems an unsound practice. Judges should remain open to the arguments of both debate teams and vote for the team that has presented the superior arguments for their positions, independent of the situation to which a community or individual already adheres.⁵

The rejection of an argument because of community notions of intuition or common sense is insupportable on logical grounds. Academic debate requires giving reasons. As a general rule, judges should not use an *ad populum* argument standard to invalidate the analysis of debaters.

Judge Intervention

One essential component of academic debate is the presence of a third party who votes for the team that has, in the words of the American Forensic Association debate ballot, "done the better debating." Judges come from widely disparate backgrounds. Some judges are communication professionals with extensive backgrounds in argumentation and debate theory, while other judges are "lay persons" in the sense that they have little experience with academic debate. All judges, however, have an obligation to make a decision between the competing teams at the conclusion of each debate. One perspective suggests that judges make decisions about who won or lost a debate without interjecting personal or community

as would a judge who embraced an argument only on the basis of her or his intuition and/or common-sense perceptions. These judges in some cases might assign specific meanings to the words in the resolution and therefore determine before the debate round what arguments are "acceptable" and "unacceptable." For these judges, the "topic reality" and the "real world" are constant and never subject to change, and some arguments will be unacceptable, regardless of debaters' new and unique ways of understanding the topic. Ultimately, this practice poses the risk of debaters becoming unaccustomed to dealing with things that are or could be "different"—outside of the preconceived reality that a judge imposes on the debate experience—when arguments are rejected on the basis of judge intuitions or beliefs regarding common sense.

When a judge rejects an argument on the basis of intuition or common sense, it seems reasonable to call this practice judge intervention. Such a practice is undesirable in an activity that values pedagogy, fairness, and the development of research skills. Not only is intervention unfair to debaters, who cannot hope to forecast judge intuitions, but, when judges intervene by appealing to intuition, for example, argumentation becomes secondary to the inarguable beliefs of auditors. Such a problem may be an occasional feature of public-address situations, but frequent judge appeals to intuition in forensic argument evaluation would undoubtedly lead to much student frustration, especially since judge forewarning about personal notions of common sense and intuition seems difficult. Further, such appeals would run counter to the emphasis of academic debate on reasoned decision making based on competing arguments made by student advocates.

Conclusion

We do not mean to imply that coaches and judges should be required to tolerate and vote for "bad" arguments. As an example, if no warrant exists for a claim, a judge justifiably could reject that claim if she or he explained, prior to the debate, the need to adhere to such a Toulmin-esque model of argument. But a student who has carefully constructed an argument for the rejection of capitalism or the establishment of a world government should not be punished for the intuitions of a judge regarding such an argument. However strongly a judge feels about a given issue in the "real world," she or he should attempt to give a fair hearing to arguments she or he personally disbelieves on intuitive or common-sensical grounds. In summary, debate judges, as a general rule, should not rely on intuition or common sense to make win-loss decisions in academic debate, since such decision making is not grounded in arguments that can be evaluated. Neither intuition nor common sense provides a justifiable "reason" for a decision.

Notes

¹ In the bound volume of judging philosophy statements provided to competitors and coaches at the 1992 CEDA National Tournament, 52 of these 170 statements include references to intuition and/or counter-intuitive arguments. While many of these 52 statements are critical of appeals to intuition, others indicate the appropriateness of such a standard for argument evaluation. Consider this extract from Professor Gary Deaton's judging philosophy: "If an argument is counterintuitive[sic] to me, I am not going to vote for it, regardless of how clearly it may have been 'dropped' by the opposition."

The new debate-sponsoring organization to which we refer is a proposed "National Educational Debate Association" (NEDA) as advocated, among others, by Professor Gary Horn of Ferris State University. The formation of this organization was first discussed at the 1994 meeting of the Central States Communication Association Convention. The draft NEDA "Statement of Objectives and Procedures," printed in the May, 1994, issue of the *Debate Educator*, contains multiple references to intuition and common sense: "Analysis, explanation, and appeals to common sense are considered appropriate argumentative strategies." "Arguments that may appear counter intuitive or peripheral to the debate resolution should be avoided even if they can be well explained and documented." "Advocates should understand the risk that decision makers may dismiss claims that appear counter-intuitive" ("Letter to Coaches," 10).

² Occasional use of "lay" critics who are unfamiliar with the lexicon of academic debate and who are willing to refer to standards of intuition or common sense may have some educational benefit for undergraduate debaters. Our argument will be that a general or community-wide retreat to standards of argument evaluation based on intuition or common sense would be counterproductive.

³ Bok explains the difference between justification and claims made on some other basis: "Justification must involve more than such untested personal steps of reasoning. To justify is to defend as just, right, or proper, by providing adequate reasons. . . . Such justification requires an audience" (91). As Rorty has already indicated, intuition is most often understood as "unjustified true belief." We argue below that academic debate requires the public justification explained by Bok, rather than reliance on unjustifiable claims for decision making. However, we do not intend to imply that all judges should provide oral justifications for their decisions at the close of debates. Such an argument is beyond the scope of this paper, since written ballots also provide a public justification of sorts.

⁴ Some judges announce a more moderate reliance on intuition and/or common sense as setting a higher threshold for the burden of proof. For example, a judge might argue that the "drug testing = nuclear war" scenario we provided at the beginning of this essay will require a higher burden of proof than will more intuitive or common-sensical argumentation. In his 1992 CEDA National Tournament judging philosophy, Professor Edward Inch explains that "I am not thrilled with counter-intuitive arguments and expect a higher burden of proof. I weigh the probability of a counter-intuitive argument against the probability of an intuitive argument to assess risk"

We believe that this stated position on burdens of proof is educationally problematic, since this practice reduces the intellectual demands on the team confronted by the suspect argument. However, as amateur psychoanalysts, we do admit that a higher burden of proof for these suspect arguments may be psychologically inevitable, despite any attempts on their part to resist the imposition of personal beliefs in this regard.

⁵ Our intent is *not* to imply a naive faith in a marketplace of ideas (see Bunch). Yet academic debate provides one of the few places where the distorting effects of unequal status and power among participants are potentially negated by judge commitment to procedural rules (for example, equal time) and community sanction (for example, frequent hostile allusions to "repping out," or the suggestion of many coaches, judges, and debaters that voting for a team on the basis of that team's reputation is inappropriate behavior for a judge).

⁶ The term "judge intervention" is sometimes used differently. Some suggest that judges inevitably must engage in some intervention in order to reflect on competing arguments and to come to a final decision between competitors. This need for "minimal intervention" by debate judges does not seem controversial. Another use of the intervention label condemns *any* external standard for argument evaluation employed by a debate judge, since

argument standards might be the subject of dispute in individual debates. In response, we believe that a judge justifiably might provide debaters with prior warning about her or his reliance on a particular set of standards for argument evaluation; this "fair warning" would maximize fairness for the participants in a debate in those cases where a judge does not consider disputes over argument standards appropriate. However, giving such a prior warning about intuitive predispositions or perceptions of common sense seems particularly difficult to us.

We do not wish to oppose the practice of awarding speaker points in ways that encourage some practices and discourage others. Further, we understand that judges may perceive debate rounds quite differently than do other observers and still not "intervene" in the restricted sense of the term as we employ it in this paper. Finally, *contra* Bunch, we believe that our concerns regarding judge intervention are analytically distinct from any defense of *tabula rasa*. In addition to the inevitable intrusion required of judges in order to interpret arguments and to make decisions, judges also might set up a number of procedural demands for "argument"—thus violating the precepts implied by the *tabula rasa* metaphor—while simultaneously attempting to avoid the imposition of personal intuition or common sense on argument evaluation. Asking oneself "is this a complete argument?" is radically different from asking "can I vote for a team advancing an argument I find personally unsatisfying and/or incommensurable with community beliefs?"

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Manuscripts should be typed, double spaced, and prepared in accordance with the most recent MLA guidelines. Please include a detachable cover page identifying the author(s) and the institution with which the author is affiliated. As the *CEDA Yearbook* employs a system of blind review, the manuscript itself should contain no reference to the author(s) or the institution. Manuscripts may not be returned, so the author(s) is encouraged to keep the original copy. The first author will receive notification of receipt of the manuscript and all subsequent correspondence related to the manuscript.

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