

Thinking in Time: The Importance of Temporal Location in Argument

PHILLIP VOIGHT

Argument fields are a means of conceptualizing differences in the implicit standards that various audiences apply when evaluating a controversy. As Charles Willard put it, "The subject matter of field theory is 'objectifying' the social comparison process by which situated actors test their interpretations against communal standards" (1982, 46). The process of identifying fields was, for Willard, "largely a matter of describing the things its actors take for granted, their self-evident truths" (1983, 91). Fields have also been viewed as academic disciplines, means of settling the location of an issue, or processes by which an individual's standard for accepting a given claim can be categorized (Dudzczak 1989, 286).

Most debate theories are field-invariant. The burdens of a counterplan, for example, are not contingent upon the topic area from which the counterplan advantage was derived. Judges are expected to apply the same evaluative criteria when the counterplan being debated is agency in nature, when it represents the antithesis of the affirmative proposal, or when it argues for similar, yet non-topical and competitive alternative to the affirmative course of action. In a most cases, field-invariant standards of argument function to equitably divide ground, frame the nature of the dispute, facilitate clash and promote the educational value of competitive inter-collegiate debate.

Recent trends toward the use of critique arguments, narratives and counter-factual claims highlight the need to re-evaluate exclusively field-invariant debate theories. This essay focuses upon counter-factual affirmative claims as an example of the need to articulate field-dependent evidentiary standards for application in intercollegiate debate contexts. The essay is divided into three sections. Section one describes the use of counter-factuals in contemporary debate rounds. The second section examines the implications of counter-factual affirmative on the equitable division of theoretical ground between advocates. Section three proposes a burden of proof for counter-factual claims based upon evidentiary standards that are commonly accepted in the field of history.

THE NATURE AND USE OF COUNTER-FACTUAL CLAIMS

The most obvious difference between counter-factual affirmatives and their traditional counterparts is their temporal attitude concerning the proposition. Affirmative teams advancing counter-factual claims do not view the resolution as time-bound in the present. Thus situated, an affirmative's solitary resolutionally-imposed burden is to demonstrate the truth of the proposition as an historical juncture of their own choosing.

A theoretical consensus concerning the minimum *prima facie* burdens of a counter-factual first affirmative case has yet to emerge. Every team seems to argue them differently, and

Phillip Voight is Director of Forensics and Visiting Instructor at Gustavus Adolphus College, in St. Peter, Minnesota.

Voight: Temporal Location

few substantive arguments are advanced to theoretically justify the use of counter-factual claims. Counter-factual first affirmatives may be crafted to simulate either fact, value or policy cases. Although what follows is hardly an exhaustive examination of the vast range of counter-factual affirmative cases, it is sufficient to provide the reader with a representative sample of the types of cases that have been debated in recent years.

Most counter-factual advocates approach the proposition as a statement of historical fact. According to their interpretation, an affirmative need only prove that the resolution was true in fact at some point in history. An example of this approach occurred when the advertising topic was being debated. Affirmative teams attempting to prove that "advertising degrades the quality of life," cited the formation of the "beauty myth." According to these teams, the origin of the beauty myth could be precisely traced to several specific advertising campaigns that occurred during the nineteen-twenties. It was at that exact juncture, they argued, that advertisers discovered that sexual imagery could be used to promote sales.

To support this argument, affirmatives pointed to the first appearances of women with shaved underarms in advertisements (reifying un-natural gender-differences); the use of actual photographs of women, rather than pictorial representations (and the corresponding selection of non-representative body-types); and the objectification of women in advertising by equating consumption with gender behavior.¹ In sum, they argued, advertising during the twenties reified gender differentiation, and perpetuated the beauty myth. Contemporary authorities, particularly the works of Naomi Wolf (1991) and Susan Faludi (1991), were subsequently cited to demonstrate that the beauty myth has had socially deleterious effects.

Many counter-factual advocates have approached the proposition as a question of value. Affirmatives utilizing this approach present a value-criterion (or value criteria), and subsequently prove that the value has been historically violated. An example of this approach occurred when debating the proposition, "Resolved: That the United States Supreme Court has, on balance, granted excessive power to law enforcement agencies." One affirmative team argued that the ability to forcibly relocate ethnic populations for reasons that have subsequently come to be known as "ethnic cleansing" amounted to an excessive law enforcement power.

Their criteria stipulated that powers were excessive insofar as they permitted genocide or the cultural annihilation of ethnic populations. To prove their claim counter-factually, they argued that the Supreme Court's interpretation of various treaties during the settlement of the West conferred excessive law enforcement powers upon Federal authorities. The subsequent relocation of native Americans, the confiscation of native lands, and the mass extermination of native peoples during the so-called "Indian Wars," violated the criteria and warranted an affirmative ballot.

¹ See, for example, "And...I Promise," a Palmolive advertisement that featured a new bride promising to keep her "schoolgirl complexion" throughout the marriage. (Artwin, McQuade & Wright, 1979, 17).

Although rare in comparison to factual or value-based approaches, some affirmatives have advocated counter-factual policy cases. When debating whether U.S. military intervention was a justified means of promoting democracy, some teams suggested the Gulf Conflict had been poorly conducted. By not dealing a fatal blow to the Hussein regime, they argued, U.S. policymakers had failed to bring democracy and stability to the region. In addition, the sanctions that were imposed after the conflict did not prevent the re-arming of the Republican Guard, or resolve lingering fears concerning Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons arsenal.

The inherent barrier most frequently cited was the Bush administration's fear of a bloody and protracted conflict to seize Baghdad and capture the Iraqi dictator. In retrospect, these fears appear unjustified. The affirmative "solved" these problems by retroactively fiatting a different course of conduct by allied troops. Rather than declaring a cease-fire once all Iraqi troops had been removed from foreign territory, the affirmative counter-factually orders the troops to take control of the entire country and eliminate the Hussein regime.

These three examples illustrate the startling range of quasi-theoretical options available to counter-factual advocates. Typically, counter-factual affirmative cases mimic their traditional counterparts and lay claim to conventional mechanisms such as fiat, criteria, or some version of the stock issues. The ground implications of these developments are enormous, and form the basis of the next section of this essay.

COUNTER-FACTUALS AND EQUITABLE DIVISION OF GROUND

Considering counter-factuals as merely another option to be adjudicated from within traditional field-invariant frameworks egregiously violates the equitable division of ground between teams. Counter-factual cases radically increase negative preparation burdens, avoid clash by selecting time periods wherein predictable negative arguments are rendered meaningless, and sidestep the discussion of unanticipated consequences that might spring from their counter-factual examples.

It is obvious that counter-factual affirmative cases substantially increase negative research burdens. This is, in fact, the primary strategic motive for affirmative teams to present counter-factual arguments. Negative teams must be prepared to debate the merits of the proposition not only in the present, but literally in any time period that the affirmative selects. Affirmatives can be relatively certain that their opponents will have no direct evidence to refute their counter-factual claims. From a clash-oriented perspective, they win by default.

Even within fairly narrow temporal confines, negative teams must research a plethora of possible counter-factual scenarios. To fully appreciate these additional burdens, consider the case of the Vietnam War. Assume that the proposition being debated read, "Resolved: That U.S. military intervention is a justified means of promoting global democracy." This proposition is similar in wording and grammatical structure to several that have been nationally debated at

the collegiate level in recent years. Even assuming that an affirmative team charitably limited their counter-factual inquiry to the Vietnam conflict (and there is certainly no theoretical reason they would choose to do so), negative teams would have to be prepared to debate a host of possibilities.

The preface of Bui Diem's *In the Jaws of History*, for instance, claims the book is designed to "tell the modern history of Vietnam and its struggle for identity, independence and freedom" (ix). In what follows, Diem skillfully paints a portrait of South Vietnamese corruption and avarice, North Vietnamese aggression and American treachery.

As the former South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, Bui Diem asserts that U.S. intervention in January of 1975 would have saved the Army of the Republic (ARVN) from its humiliating defeats at Hue' and Da Nang, stabilized the morale of the country, and prevented the short but bloody rout that culminated with the collapse of the South on April 30, 1975. Diem's premise is that Hanoi would have eventually surrendered its territorial claim to the South in the face of mounting casualties and sustained United Nations support for the partitioning of Vietnam.

As a matter of historiography, Diem's claims are specious. ARVN's sudden collapse came as no surprise to many of its American advisors, who had long felt that the ARVN was more of a "paper army" than a trained fighting force (Sheehan, 527). Rife with graft and corruption, senior South Vietnamese officials seemed less concerned about the country's independence than maintaining their own AID-backed lifestyles (Hung & Schecter). Documents obtained after the war demonstrated the complete surprise of the Northern generals as demoralized ARVN troops fled with the slightest of provocation -- abandoning whole cities and millions of dollars of military equipment with such speed that Communist advance columns ran out of fuel before they could race to occupy their newly acquired territory (Karnow, 666; Butler, 58).

In addition to debating Diem's specific scenario, negative teams would have to be prepared to debate intervention on behalf of Ho Chi Minh during World War Two, or in its immediate aftermath (when many argue he could have been converted into a U.S. ally); intervention on behalf of the French at various points from 1948 through 1954 (which would have preserved French colonial rule); intervention on behalf of the Diem government prior to 1964, or perhaps intervention to remove Diem before the Buddhist uprisings that led to his assassination; intervention to prop up the Nygen Cao-Ky government (when many authors argue a more assertive and powerful direct U.S. presence could have deterred the North from escalating the conflict); intervention in response to the Paris peace accords and, finally, intervention during the final stages of the conflict as suggested by Bui Diem.

In addition to having to defend U.S. action at each of these temporal junctures, negative teams would also have to be prepared to debate alterations in field tactics or military doctrine throughout the conflict. The possibilities are daunting, and further complicated by the

fact that a counter-factual affirmative team could choose any form of intervention that suited their tastes (bombing, covert action, arms sales, and so forth). Locating affirmative evidence is relatively simple, as every author, it seems, has their own recipe for U.S. military success.

Beyond the difficulties posed by the unpredictability of affirmative temporal choices, negative teams also find their most potent arguments useless because affirmatives select time periods that are ill-suited for most generic arguments. It seems obvious that affirmative teams would hesitate to choose examples that are clearly disadvantageous. If an affirmative team did not want to debate bi-polarity, nuclear proliferation, Islamic Fundamentalism, and so forth, they need only select a time period prior to the genesis of the movement, philosophy, or technology that they are uncomfortable with. Negative teams have no theoretical recourse.

Alternatively, affirmative teams have an incentive to select historical periods that are not representative, and that most egregiously demonstrate the truth of the proposition. When debating the Spring 1988 proposition, "Resolved: That the American judicial system has overemphasized freedom of the press," for instance, a counter-factual affirmative team would have been strategically astute to select an example from the time period characterized by "yellow journalism," rather than alien and sedition laws.

Fiat and the so-called "but for" or "if not" tests also implicate negative ground because they allow affirmative counter-factual teams to avoid a discussion of the ill-effects that would flow from their examples. In a traditional sense, fiat allows an affirmative team to assume that their policy had been implemented. Fiat is justified because it sidesteps the prospect of endless, non-substantive debate concerning whether or not affirmative inherency mechanisms could be overcome. Without fiat, affirmative ground would be seriously threatened because negative teams could pose the affirmative inherency argument against solvency claims.

Fiat is associated with propositions of policy, and there is no corollary in either value or factual debates. Traditionally constituted, fiat offers no tactical advantage to the affirmative. Because it is a fiction that assumes ordinary democratic means of implementation, fiat does not allow the affirmative to alter attitudes, or to commit substantive changes that are not justified by the wording of the proposition. Affirmatives cannot augment their solvency arguments by fiatly willing participation, for instance, or enthusiastic enforcement. Affirmatives are still vulnerable to disadvantages, plan-meet-advantage arguments, circumvention arguments, and a host of additional problems that may arise subsequent to the hypothetical implementation of their policy.

At face value, the notion of counter-factual fiat is absurd. Actual policymakers have no opportunity to travel in time and adjust policy. In addition, this preposterous extension of fiat power is unjustified with reference to inherency, from which fiat authority is derived. The inherency barrier of counter-factual affirmative cases is metaphysical, not structural, attitudinal, or existential. Counter-factual fiat commits the same type of abuse as a traditional affirmative that "fiated away" environmental pollution or the knowledge to construct nuclear weapons.

The "but for" and "if not" tests are a counter-factual version of fiat. Affirmatives advancing these tests do not argue that they need to actually change the course of history. To demonstrate the validity of their counter-factual claims, affirmatives need only prove that "but for" their example, a particular negative consequence would not exist. (For example, "But for fashion advertising in the 1920's, sexism and the beauty myth would not presently exist.")

This stance is theoretically objectionable because it ignores the possibility of multiple causation. In any given circumstance, an event may be the result of a synergism between multiple actors. Similarly, a given development may be arrived at by multiple actors independently. "In any case, which means every case," write historians Jaques Barzun and Henry Graff, "explanation by means of a single cause, hidden, startling, or scientific explanation are to be distrusted, if not on face disallowed. The concentration of acts, motives and results can only be understood and described by the intuitive skills of the historian as artist" (173).

"But for" and "if not" tests also allow the affirmative the extraordinary power of multiple fiat. Sexist advertising could not have been eliminated in one fell swoop. Even if an affirmative team were able to accurately stipulate when complex phenomena "began," multiple uses of fiat would be required to prevent the re-emergence of the event several weeks, months, or even years later. "The rise of the beauty myth," notes Naomi Wolf, "was just one of several emerging social fictions that masqueraded as natural components of the feminine sphere, the better to enclose those women inside it" (15).

By vaguely tying their tests to concepts, rather than precisely situated events, affirmative teams substantially enlarge their ground at the expense of negative teams. They derive a tangible benefit from this expansive use of fiat. While a traditional affirmative could not resort to fiat to quell circumvention or plan-overturn arguments that would arise as the result of strong attitudinal resistance to the affirmative proposal, counter-factual advocates can essentially fiat their own solvency.

Equitable division of ground is the central purpose of debate theory and without it, the value of academic debate becomes highly questionable. When negative ground is vitiated, prior preparation becomes problematic, the premium placed on research is diminished and the possibility of informed and intelligent discussion collapses. Counter-factual claims are especially threatening in this regard because they violate ground directly, rather than incidentally. By their very nature, they require negative teams to assume additional burdens without imposing corollary burdens upon affirmatives.

"But for" and "if not" claims are also incapable of proof. Affirmative teams interpret the course of history charitably, with optimal assumptions regarding causation. "In a big and complicated case," note Barzun and Graff, "there is always, at the end of it, a residue of improbable, inexplicable fact. You do not invalidate a hypothesis by showing that the chances were against the occurrence of some of the events that it presupposes: many things that happen are actually improbable" (169). To prove an historical claim requires attention to historical

method and an awareness of evidentiary standards that are commonly accepted within the field of history.

AN EVIDENTIARY BURDEN OF PROOF FOR COUNTER-FACTUAL CLAIMS

Counter-factual advocates should face the same burden of proof in debate rounds that they would be held to if their claims were being evaluated by historians. As a threshold test, a field-dependent burden of proof might include the following items: (1) Insistence that an actual factual or historical controversy existed; (2) Adherence to historical standards concerning causation and the reversibility of events; (3) Respect for historical research methods, including the documentation and authentication process for primary sources; and, finally, (4) Strict adherence to historical "rules of evidence."

Counter-factual claims are problematic at the evidentiary level because they originate from a competitive impulse, rather than as the result of a bona fide historical controversy. Within the field of history, factual debates arise from the need to correct erroneous impressions of the past, or to cast light on poorly understood historical events. Historical research is normally posed in opposition to, rather than in tandem with contemporary knowledge, and it seeks to reconstruct historical lessons that have been mistakenly drawn from the past.

Susan Armitage and Elizabeth Jamieson's excellent book, *The Women's West*, resulted from the failure of contemporary historians to accurately depict the daily lives of women settlers on the American Frontier. Likewise, Robert Hughes' *The Fatal Shore* retold the narrative of Australia's founding in an attempt to illustrate the importance of indigenous and colonial institutions in shaping contemporary Australian society.

Factual debates may also arise because new evidence surfaces that challenges traditional assumptions, or because historians have inappropriately attributed causality to historical events. The effort by Grove Press to publish the massive eleven-volume diary of sexual practices of a Victorian man was motivated (at least in part), by the discovery of the text itself (*My Secret Life*). George Chauncey's brilliant *Gay New York*, and Alan Berube's *Coming Out Under Fire*, thoroughly dismiss the commonly-held assumptions that the organized gay liberation movement began with the Stonewall Rebellion.

In each of the above examples, a factual debate arose because existing historical evidence was ill-suited to explain a given occurrence. Another source of factual debate among historians is the desire to correct formal histories that have been ideologically tainted. Examples of this type of inquiry include Stanley Coben's *Rebellion Against Victorianism*, which sought to sever the connections between progressivism/industrialism and the decline of Victorianism that had become entrenched in traditional history circles, and Albert Hourani's desire to write a useable, unbiased and concise history of the Arab world.

Although each of the above examples are historical debates concerning questions of fact, they have little in common with counter-factual arguments. Legitimate factual inquiries are motivated by missing or erroneous historical evidence, rather than possible tactical benefits for the advocate. Historians seldom engage in "what if" speculation, particularly concerning matters of record. In most instances, they follow established historical procedures in conducting their research, evaluating evidence and formulating conclusions. In contrast, counter-factual advocates make little attempt to present historically credible conclusions.

Causation and the reversibility of events are frequently problems for counter-factual advocates. Unlike professional historians, affirmative teams frequently assume causation from singular historical events, and do not examine, (and in fact have no way of examining), unintended consequences that spring from their counter-factual positions. Only in rare circumstances can counter-factual arguments be logically settled. It is a matter of record, for example, that if the Wright brothers had not made their historic flight at Kittyhawk, a Massachusetts group would have done so shortly thereafter. In a counter-factual sense, "If not for the Wright brothers," aviation as we know it would still exist.

Most counter-factual claims are not as easily resolved. If Hitler had been assassinated, it is possible that the German war effort would have ground to a halt and the Nazi regime might have sued for peace -- saving hundreds of thousands of lives and avoiding the complete destruction of German cities. It is equally possible, however, that German leadership would have been assumed by Goering or Goebbels -- men every bit as evil and messianic as Hitler, but infinitely more pragmatic and effective as military strategists.

In Hitler's absence, men such as these might have more prudently managed the war effort, might have sent Panzer divisions to Normandy when Hitler should have, might have prolonged Germany's survival and extended the war. If they had successfully turned the allies back on D-Day, and invaded a weakened and demoralized England, there is an outside chance that they could have altered the outcome of the war in fundamental ways.

This digression is, of course, absurd when viewed from the perspective of professional historians. As V.H. Gallbraith puts it, "When we study the origin of states and institutions, we are in the unhappy position of knowing the results of the process that we are examining, and thereby, we are tempted to think that it was implicit in the beginning" (6). Hitler's demise is not a topic of historical inquiry because no argument that springs from it can be logically proven.

Counter-factual claims typically violate historical standards of evidence. Most represent the fallacy of argumentum ad ignoratum. At a fundamental level, counter-factuals obscure legitimate issues of historical inquiry, such as framing events within their broader historical contexts and establishing the chronological progression of events. Because they are tactically rather than historically motivated, they suppress exactly those issues that form the focal points of legitimate historical studies.

If the teams that had defended the beauty myth counter-factual mentioned earlier had conducted even a cursory examination of the historical record, for instance, they would have found that the myth was already firmly entrenched by the nineteen-twenties. By confusing a symptom with a cause, and inexplicably ignoring the well-established popularity of make-up as far back as Egyptian times (Bobrick), and of corsets, hoops and braziers as early as the reign of Louis the XVI (Schama), the affirmative presented an erroneous impression of the historical record.

Historical evidence written shortly after events transpired is immediately suspect. These "histories" are often motivated by a desire to produce exculpatory evidence and improve the image of participants after the fact. Likewise, documents produced by participants themselves should be treated with caution. At a minimum, contemporaneous evidence and records should meet the following evidentiary tests: 1) The author was in a position to accurately gauge the events described; 2) The author did not have a vested self-interest in the outcome of the historical dispute described; 3) The conclusions correlate with other records that are known to be accurate; and, 4) The conclusions can be externally verified and corroborated by examining other portions of the historical record.²

The application of contemporary values to historical questions also raises thorny evidentiary questions. It is obvious that certain historical practices are deplorable when viewed from the present. Such practices can and should be condemned. To approach history from a scholarly perspective, however, requires the student or researcher to suppress their own value schemes and assume the values of the period and culture under examination. "To read primary sources with an inflexibly present-day scheme of moral values," write methodologists Cantor and Schneider, "is to close one's eyes to the possibility of coming to appreciate the values and achievements of the society and people that we are studying" (45).

Ignoring the value settings within which historical events transpired disregards the central premise of historical inquiry. Cantor and Schneider's insistence upon judging historical events according to historical values is echoed by every major history methodologist, including former American Historical Association Presidents Charles Beard and Sidney Hook (1954), methodologist Vernon Dibble (1963), post-modernist historian Hans Kellner (1987), literary historian C.B. McCullagh (1987), psycho-history critic David Stannard (1980), oral historian

²These standards are condensed and paraphrased from Vernon Dibble, "Four Types of Inference From Historical Documents to Events," *History and Theory*, 3:2, (1963), 203-221.

Robert Winks (1970), behavioralist Robert Berkhofer Jr. (1969), and even popular history writers such as William Manchester (1974) and Shelby Foote (1993).³

When the student or researcher makes a-priori assumptions that historical events were "wrong" when judged by contemporary values, he or she runs the risk of seriously misunderstanding the phenomenon under study. Chauncey's central argument in *Gay New York*, for example, is that sexual binarism did not exist as we currently know it. Because there was no sociocultural concept of "gay," criticisms of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation during the period he studied are non-sequitur.

When a particular value perspective drives an historical inquiry, the results become suspect. There are a number of real-world examples of counter-factual claims that evaluate history from the perspective of contemporary social values. The hallmark of Nazi and Stalinist history writing was their relentless effort to "re-write" the past in order to demonstrate the "scientific progression" of their respective forms of government. In addition to producing intellectually inferior historical research,⁴ their a-priori ideological focus caused them to overlook significant artifacts that contradicted their claims, and exposed them to numerous hoaxes and frauds (Harris, 1986).

Properly situated, affirmative counter-factual advocates would need to prove that an event violated the values of the time period in which it originally transpired. Failure to insist on this standard of proof not only poisons the historical inquiry, but also seriously strains the negative team's burden of rejoinder. It is obviously inequitable for the negative team to have to defend the burning of witches, for example, when the affirmative team can select an event from one time period and a criterion from another.

History is an art, not a science. "As compared with mathematics, the physical sciences, and indeed, some of the social sciences," observe Beard and Hook, "Historiography suffers from major disadvantages" (105). The voracity of historical evidence is consequently highly dependent upon the methods from which it was derived. Few would argue that contemporary disputes are easily settled. There are many issues over which reasonable minds may differ. Because they are

³For instance, in *The Glory and the Dream*, Manchester argues that Roosevelt's duplicity in misleading the country regarding the level of American involvement with the British war effort must be understood within the context of prevailing normative assumptions concerning presidential leadership. Likewise, Shelby Foote maintains that Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War was, viewed from the perspective of Lincoln's contemporaries, a reasonable and appropriate response to the internal security threats posed by the conflict. See William Manchester, *The Glory and the Dream*, (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1974), and Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative*, 3 vols., (New York, NY: Random House, 1993).

⁴Most historians do not regard these attempts as historically-based. As V.H. Gallbraith argued, advocacy history is unacceptable "for it means that the historian, like the barrister, is no more than the advocate and defender of one side or the other" (4).

currently in dispute, however, there is an incentive for the advocates of each side of the controversy to produce the best available evidence.

Counter-factual questions, because they are "dead issues," do not inspire the same attention to detail, nor do they attract the same quality of opinion as do their present-day counterparts. In fact, the credibility of authors who advance counter-factual claims should be questioned automatically given the strong distaste for such arguments within the field of history. A survey of the sources upon which many of the recent counter-factual affirmative cases have been based leads one to share the conclusion of Woody West that counter-factualists are either lay-people, crackpots or both (40). Only by insisting upon an evidentiary burden of proof for historical claims can a sense of balance and reasonability be restored to counter-factual debates.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Some may argue that the objections that I have raised are simply part of the argumentative arsenal of the negative team and should not be considered theoretical in nature. In practice, however, counter-factual affirmative teams enjoy tangible benefits from the use of historical examples, and they should therefore be expected to meet the minimum theoretical burdens of their selected field of inquiry. This is no different from expecting that evidence derived from the physical sciences should conform to the experimental conditions commonly accepted by scholars in the field. Field-dependent evidentiary standards prevent data produced with a particular series of assumptions in mind from being misused in another context.

In the alternative, any team with an ounce of imagination and access to an *Encyclopedia Britannica* can generate scores of counter-factual examples that prove the "truth" of the resolution. Rounds such as these barely rise above the level of gibberish, and maximize the competitive aspects of participation in forensics at the complete expense of its educational value. As a scholar interested in both history and argumentation, I hope that a fuller appreciation of the nexus between these two fields will be to the betterment of both.

WORKS CITED

- Anonymous. *My Secret Life*. Vol. & 2. New York, NY: Grove Press, 1994.
- Appelby, Joyce, Hunt, Lynn and Jacob, Margaret. *Telling the Truth About History*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1994.
- Armitage, Susan and Jamieson, Elizabeth. *The Women's West*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.
- Atwan, Robert, McQuade, Donald and Wright, John. *Edsels, Luckies and Frigidaires: Advertising the American Way*. New York, NY: Dell Publishing, 1971.
- Barzun, Jaques and Graff, Henry. *The Modern Researcher*. 4th ed. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1985.
- Beard, Charles and Hook, Sidney. "Problems of Terminology in Historical Writing." *Social Sciences Research Bulletin*. (1954): 105-130.
- Benson, Bobrick. *Fearful Majesty*. New York, NY: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1987.
- Berkhoffer, Robert F., Jr. *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis*. New York, NY: Collier-MacMillan, 1969.

- Berube, Alan. *Coming Out Under Fire: A History of Gay Men and Women in World War Two*. New York, NY: Plume, 1991.
- Butler, David. *The Fall of Saigon: Scenes from the Sudden End of a Long War*. New York, NY: Dell Publishing Company, 1975.
- Cantor, Norman and Schneider, Richard. *How to Study History*. New York, NY: Thomas Crowell and Company, 1967.
- Chauncey, George. *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture and the Making of the Gay Male World 1890-1940*. New York, NY: Harper-Collins, 1994.
- Coben, Stanley. *Rebellion Against Victorianism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Dibble, Vernon. "Four Types of Inference from Historical Documents to Events." *History and Theory*, 3:2, (1963): 203-221em. Bui. *In the Jaws of History*. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1987.
- Diem, Bui. *In the Jaws of History*. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1987.
- Faludi, Susan. *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Woman*. New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 1991.
- Footo, Shelby. *The Civil War: A Narrative*. Vol. 2. New York, NY: Random House, 1993.
- Gallbraith, V.H. *An Introduction to the Study of History*. London, England: C.A. Watt and Company, 1964.
- Harris, Robert. *Selling Hitler: The Extraordinary Story of the Con Job of the Century*. New York, NY: Pantheon, 1986.
- Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Hughes, Robert. *Fatal Shore: The Epic of Australia's Founding*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987.
- Hung, Nguyen Tien and Schecter, Jerrod L. *The Palace File*. New York, NY: Harper Row, 1986.
- Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam: A History*. New York, NY: Viking Press, 1983.
- Kellner, Hans. "Narrativity in History: Post-Structuralism and Since." *History and Theory*, 26:4, (1987): 1-27.
- Manchester, William. *The Glory and the Dream*. Vol. 1. Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1974.
- McCullagh, C.B. "The Truth of Historical Narratives." *History and Theory*. 26:4 (1987): 30-46.
- Schama, Simon. *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.
- Sheehan, Neil. *A Bright Shining Lie*. New York, NY: Random House, 1988.
- Stannard, David. *Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psycho-History*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Taylor, Mark. Ed. *Deconstruction in Context*. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- West, Woody. "At the Movies, History and Fact Get Stomped." *Washington Insight*. (26 September 1994): 40-41.
- Willard, Charles A. "Argument Fields." In *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research*. Cox, R. & Willard, Charles A., Ed. Carbondale, ILL: Southern Illinois Press, 1982.
- Winks, Robert C., ed. *The Historian as Detective*. New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1970.
- Wolf, Naomi. *The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty are Used Against Women*. New York, NY: William Morrow, 1991.