

INCREASING VALUE CLASH: A PROPOSITIONAL AND STRUCTURAL APPROACH

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Since Trapp's (1977) charge that "the forensic community determine guidelines for debating propositions of judgment," numerous articles have been published to this end (Brownlee, 1980, 1981; Matlon 1978, 1981; Thomas and Fryar, 1981).

Justifiably, many of these articles have addressed such issues as presumption, inherency, and stock issues. In so doing, many authors have borrowed heavily from the realm of policy debate theory.

However, Vasilus (1980) argued that "value proposition debate cannot rely on piecemeal pilfering from policy debate theory. . . .

Debaters need to create new paradigms to advance their own argumentative needs" (p. 8).

We would go even further to suggest that argumentation theorists and debate coaches should also contribute to constructing models for arguing value propositions.

Value vs. Judgment Propositions

The literature appears to interchange the use of the term "value propositions" and "judgment propositions." This uncritical exchange may confuse what argumentative approaches should be employed. Ziegelmüller and Dause (1975) define propositions of judgment as "descriptive, predictive, or evaluative statements which assert the existence or worth of something" (p. 14). To predict, describe, or evaluate an event, person, or object, does not necessarily imply a "value" is at issue. Here we define a value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-

state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5). In other words, to argue the judgment proposition that "'Raiders of the Lost Ark' is a great movie" in no way brings into clash values or value systems if we use the definitive and designative stock issue approach (Matlon, 1978).

Kelley (1981) has implied that CEDA presently argues "quasi-value propositions," which might be defined as laden with policy implications (e.g., that if illegal immigrants are detrimental, they should be deported; that if religious groups harm the American political process they should be gagged). These implied policy options make it even more difficult for converting policy-oriented debaters and coaches from breaking the NDT mold. Matlon (1981) recommended that ethical topics would be highly appropriate for academic debate. He suggested such topics as "Resolved, That courage is an admirable trait; That democracy is the best form of government." To bring into focus, its own argumentative theory, we would similarly support the idea that topics be more purely value-oriented, and that a clear distinction be made between judgment propositions and value propositions.

Lack of Value Clash

Warnick (1981) provided us with an example of debaters who were to argue the "merits of the concept of a system of compulsory national service"

(p. 112), when many ended up arguing the advantages and disadvantages of specific types of service. We agree with her indictment that "value conflicts. . . were largely ignored" (p. 112). In debating that illegal immigrants are detrimental to the U.S., debaters would often resort to comparing the problems caused by the illegals (e.g., disease, drug smuggling, crime) to the benefits (e.g., paying taxes, a ready labor pool, a Mexican safety valve). Such an evaluation is not necessarily clashing at the level of values.

Values might be implied in many of these costs and benefits, but such value statements are rarely explicated and debated per se. In this paper we will (1) argue that values should be explicitly presented, substantiated, and debated and (2) provide a structure for executing value clash.

Justification for Value Debating

Although it appears justifiable that values should be debated, this position seems accepted without question. Thomas and Fryar (1981) asserted, "It is our intuitive feeling that one of the main reasons value resolutions are coming into vogue is to give students experience in debating values, not facts, and in relating arguments to people, not to computers" (p. 529). But the additional experience in dealing with value clash is warranted because of the societal involvement in such conflict: "Value controversies permeate contemporary society" (Warnick, 1981, p. 109); individual value clashes contribute to breakdowns in communication (Gordon, 1969); and value conflicts in the workplace produce dissatisfaction (Goldhaber, 1979). The examination and orderly processing of these conflicts certainly is within the purview of argumentation. Inlow (1972)

felt that because values determine human behavior it is the duty of formal education to expose individuals to values so they can understand and assess them.

Value Conflict Resolution (VCR)

In the past, general attempts have been made to regularize the procedures for effective refutation. Among these is the four-step approach advocated by Ehninger and Brockriede (1972, p. 209). In terms of value argumentation, Windes and Hastings (1965) have hesitated in developing as regularized an approach, but have identified some of the essentials:

However, there are undoubtedly cases when two sets of values conflict and one must choose between them. (An oft-repeated conflict is between idealistic and practical values.) What to do? Here we prefer not to advise the advocate (p. 166).

Nevertheless, we must consider some of the methods for evaluating the process. Because the principle of inference is similar in process to the argument by criteria of definition, the methods of evaluation are also similar. First, the criteria of values in the warrant must be made explicit. If the criteria are not stated, they can often be inferred from the evidence of the argument as well from the advocate's understanding of the values surrounding the field. These value standards should be analyzed to determine their acceptability (p. 167).

Another attempt to organize value argumentation is the three stock issues approach of Smith and Hunsaker (1972):

There are three stock issues in a controversy over value. The first is "What is the value presented in the ultimate issue?". . . our values shape our basic cognitive structure. It is essential here for the advocate to determine the value appealed to. For example, if the ultimate issue is whether or not the control of pollution is economically feasible, the basic value is money. Having determined the basic value, the advocate should consider the second stock issue, "What are the criteria of the value?" That is, in our example, how would one go about demonstrating whether or not pollution control is economically feasible? Finally, he should ask what facts, if true, would support the criteria, and whether these facts have been brought to light in the controversy. Having explored these three stock issues, the advocate may be able to

demonstrate a rational basis for supporting or opposing the value judgment contained in the ultimate issue (p. 41).

While these attempts have provided some direction in arguing a particular value, they unfortunately do not provide a model to resolve value conflict. According to Warnick (1981):

The central focus of argument on a value proposition ought to be on the values which the respective advocates are defending. The advocate's purpose is to provide listeners with good reasons for evaluating the topic the same way that they have. Rather than providing conclusive empirical verification for a single interpretation of the proposition, advocates in a value dispute are making recommendations and justifying their interpretation of the principle contained in the proposition (p. 112):

After synthesizing what we view as best of Ehninger and Brockriede, Windes and Hastings, and Smith and Hunsaker in an effort to satisfy Warnick's concern for central focus or direct value clash, we suggest the following five-step approach to value clash resolution (VCR):

- Step One: Identify the value to be affirmed and the value to be refuted.
- Step Two: Present the criteria to be used to resolve the value conflict, and demonstrate why it is reasonable for resolving this conflict.
- Step Three: Apply the criteria to the value to be affirmed and show why the criteria is met.
- Step Four: Apply the criteria to the value to be refuted and show why the criteria, although reasonable, is not met.
- Step Five: Demonstrate why winning this value conflict should resolve the conflict over winning the ballot.

The following is presented as an hypothetical example applying the VCR model under the illegal immigration topic:

As second affirmative, at this point in the debate I would like to resolve the separate value positions adopted by the affirmative and negative. (1) Please juxtapose the affirmative value of American jobs for American workers with the negative value of preserving American national security by preserving good relations with Mexico.

(2) The criteria which should be employed to resolve these two values (comes from Robin Williams in American Society, 1970) include the pervasiveness of the value, the chronology of the value, the determination with which it is believed in, and the credibility of those who support the value. This criteria is the most reasonable to use because it allows for the weighing of the evidence presented by both sides. (3) Upon application of this criteria to the affirmative value, we see that recent polls indicate that unemployment among American workers is the most pressing national problem, that it has been ranked higher than foreign policy issues since World War II, that memories of the Great Depression are still sharp, and that many important people both in and out of government have agreed that there is harm in continuing to absorb illegal immigrants into our workforce. (4) By contrast, few Americans perceive a threat to national security over illegal immigrants and the position of the Mexican government; most Americans have little concern for Mexican workers, and if it became a question of employing their brother or a Mexican, there is little doubt who they would choose. Finally, except for small businessmen, there is little credible support for the negative value position. Therefore, (5) in terms of the dominant versus the less dominant value, the value of American jobs for American workers has been shown to be the more dominant value in the hierarchy of values than American-Mexican relations, and the proposition should be affirmed.

In discussing the duties of speakers, Warnick (1981) typified the current practice: first speakers ought to deal with prima facie questions, and that second speakers should deal with "alternative hierarchies" (p. 119). Given the fact that under this approach little clash would occur until second negative constructive, we feel strongly that both teams should be required to state clearly their value positions in first constructives. While not going this far, the majority of coaches responding to the 1980 Reno Tournament Survey (in Kelley, 1981, p. 12) agreed with the statement "the values a team defends in CEDA debate must be made quite explicit by the team before it is likely I would vote for them." This inclination on the part of responding coaches, coupled with the opportunity to engage in value clash earlier in constructives, offers

exciting possibilities for the future of CEDA debate.

In summary, this article has sought to identify deficiencies which exist in the literature about value debate and to offer recommendations for enhancing intercollegiate value debate. First, we have recommended moving toward more propositions of value and away from evaluative propositions in an effort to encourage value clash. Secondly, we have offered a prescriptive approach for coaches and debaters seeking a means of resolving value conflicts. Finally, it has been urged that earlier value clash occur by requiring that clear value positions be taken and defended by both first affirmative and first negative speakers.

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