EDITOR'S NOTE

While this yearbook marks the end of my appointment as editor, it more importantly signals the beginning of an annual publication with the appearance and substance to stand beside the other scholarly journals in the forensic field.

This new beginning for the CEDA yearbook has been built on the original eight volumes. For the most part, these eight provide the theory and practice of CEDA debate—the largest form of intercollegiate debate in the United States today. Don Brownlee deserves enormous credit for his foresight and diligent efforts in founding the CEDA yearbook and editing the first six volumes.

It was the decision of this year's Editorial Board to invite Ronald Matlon to prepare the lead article for the "new yearbook." Dr. Matlon graciously consented to our invitation. It is our great pleasure and privilege that Dr. Matlon reflects on the decade after the publication of his seminal work on value debating in 1978.

As my tenure as editor draws to a close, I have appreciated this opportunity to service the CEDA organization and to grow from the challenging editorial experience. My efforts have been assisted immeasurably by the many individuals who have served as associate editors: Thompson Biggers, Joe Cardot, Russell Church, Candy Clark, Craig Dudczak, David Frank, Ann Gill, Dale Herbeck, Ed Hollatz, Steve Hunt, Dick Lesicko, Susan Millsap, Scott Nobles, Clark Olson, Chris Shea, Don Swanson, Joe Tuman, Charles Wilbanks. Their comments and criticisms have provided me with direction and insight. Hopefully, our joint efforts have benefited those scholars who have submitted manuscripts to the yearbooks, and in the process we have all contributed to the knowledge of intercollegiate debate.

Most sincerely,

Brenda J. Logue

The CEDA Yearbook is published annually in the Fall by the Cross Examination Debate Association, Michael Bartanen, Executive Secretary, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, WA 98447. The layout and computer typesetting of the Yearbook were done by Aardvark Press, Ltd., Towson, MD, and printed by Kendall/Hunt Publishing, Dubuque, IA.

DEBATING PROPOSITIONS OF VALUE: AN IDEA REVISITED

Ronald J. Matlon
Towson State University

In the spring term of the 1974-75 debate year, CEDA chose its first value debate resolution, and "no one knew what to do!" (Tomlinson, 1983, p. 2). That proposition was, "Resolved: That American television has sacrified quality for entertainment." Since the spring of 1975, the word "should" has never appeared in any official CEDA debate resolution. Hence, a grand experiment in value analysis was undertaken even though CEDA is not bound constitutionally or in any other way to debating only value propositions.

A decade has also passed since I wrote my first thoughts on debating value propositions (Matlon, 1978). I have been both amazed and gratified by the ongoing reactions to that manuscript as well as its companion piece (Matlon, 1981). The struggle over how to analyze and evaluate value proposition arguments has occupied considerable space and time in the literature of academic forensics as well as in the substance of several CEDA debate rounds.

Unfortunately, my impression, shared by many others, is that CEDA is not clear-cut value debate. Nor is it policy debate. Nor is it audience debate. Nor is it NDT debate. CEDA is an organization which has been very successful in sponsoring academic curricular debating and in producing a body of literature which makes it appear as the centerpiece of value debate activity, but the kind of debating which it wishes to sponsor is not clearly defined, particularly in terms of helping coaches teach students the analytical skills necessary to perform well in rounds of CEDA competition. Anyone who claims s/he can identify a "model CEDA round" is perpetuating a myth. That round may have been a demonstration of outstanding debate, but it cannot typify the mission of CEDA, since that mission is blurry. More will be said about the claims made in this paragraph later in the paper.

With this overview of CEDA debate in mind, I want you to know how pleased and complimented I am to be invited here to reflect on a decade of writing on and practice in CEDA debating, and to offer some thoughts about the future.[1] The nub of my remarks will focus on CEDA's mission. As already noted, I do not see a clear mission today, although the theory and practice erroneously indicate that the organization stands for the promotion of value debate. At this point, I simply want to point out that, in searching for a mission, CEDA leaders should begin with the following question: "What is the most fundamental baseline information we can teach novice debaters who are being introduced to CEDA for the first time?" In other words, CEDA leaders need to go back to the beginning, to core knowledge and basic theory.

Nearly all of us begin teaching/coaching newcomers something about propositions and issue analysis. Textbooks in argumentation begin this way. Opening meetings with squads of newcomers begin this way. We like to identify with assurance that the

proposition we are debating is one of fact, value, or policy (or similar nomenclature), and then proceed to explain the stock issues implicit in the chosen resolution. Stock issues are valuable teaching tools because they give our students a framework for building cases. My pedagogical philosophy is that a clear framework instills confidence in our students, especially the floundering beginners. Prescriptive formulas which are clear and sound produce students who are well educated in the fundamentals of debate analysis. Being well educated in the fundamentals is necessary before our students begin to engage in experimental analysis on their own. Therefore, as CEDA identifies its mission, it must focus on what "fundamentals" of the activity all of its students should be expected to know.

It is in this spirit that I write this paper, focusing on the propositions CEDA selects to debate and what can be taught to our novice debaters about how to approach those propositions. My impressions and suggestions will be organized around the following three topics: (1) how issue analysis theory for value propositions has developed to date, (2) problems in CEDA's approach to value debate, and (3) where do we go from here?

Development of Issue Analysis Theory for Value Propositions

An abundance of refreshing and thoughtful theoretical dialogue has taken place as a result of the CEDA experiment in value analysis. The definitive and designative stock issue approach to analyzing value debate propositions (Matlon, 1978) has been impressively refined in the literature of academic debate over the past ten years. A number of authors have advanced the spirit of my objectivist approach to issue analysis. Four illustrations will suffice. First, Verch and Logue (1982) offer a five-step approach to analyzing propositions of value. Within the context of the definitive and designative issues, I take the liberty here to restructure their five-step approach as follows:

I. Definitive stock issue: Justify the standard or measure to be used, whether criteria, a model, an ideal, or desirable aims or objectives.
   A. Step One: Identify the value to be affirmed and the value to be refuted (e.g., American jobs for American workers versus preserving good relations with foreign countries).
   B. Step Two: Present the criteria to be used to resolve the value conflict, and demonstrate why it is [they are] reasonable for resolving this conflict (e.g., how pervasive, recent, intense, and credible are the values noted in Step One).

II. Designative stock issue: Determine whether the subject of the evaluation meets the criteria defined.
   A. Step Three: Apply the criteria to the value to be affirmed and show why the criteria are met (e.g., polls show unemployment in America is the most pressing national concern).

   B. Step Four: Demonstrate why winning this value conflict should resolve the conflict over winning the ballot (e.g., low domestic unemployment is a more pervasive, recent, intense, and credible value to the American public than any foreign policy issue).

Second, Bartanen and Frank (1983) and Bartanen (1987) identify four steps which advance the definitive-designative stock issue framework. They utilize the audience's agenda as their paramount criterion. Again, taking the liberty of re-structuring, their steps are outlined as follows:

I. Definitive stock issue: Justify the standard or measure to be used, whether criteria, a model, an ideal, or desirable aims or objectives.
   A. Step One: Define the issues and values implied in the resolution (e.g., improved relations with the Soviet Union means increased agricultural sales and cultural exchanges).
   B. Step Two: Make assumptions about the audiences and their value systems (e.g., the judge/critic in the immediate situation must believe that increased agricultural sales and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union will result in improved relations with the United States and that improved Soviet-American relations is a desirable value).

II. Designative stock issue: Determine whether the subject of the evaluation meets the criterion defined.
   A. Step Three: Determine the significance of the exigence (e.g., the seriousness of the Soviet-American relationship problem for this audience and its relevance in terms of the judge/critics value hierarchy).
   B. Step Four: Compare attention given to the germane problems and values of the immediate audience with potential competing problems and values (e.g., a comparison of improved Soviet-American relations with improved military preparedness, improved health care in America, etc.).

Third, Brownlee (1987) elaborated on the development of the definitive stock issue alone, particularly as it relates to the selection of criteria used as standards for a particular value judgment. Brownlee states that each chosen criterion should be clear, relevant, consistently applied, and supported by good reasons.

Fourth, Tuman (1987) says that a prima-facie case for a proposition of value requires the establishment of four stock issues:

I. Value identification (Recognize values explicity stated in the resolution, and others which may be implied. Using Rokeach's (1981) distinction, identify which values are instrumental and which are terminal.)

II. Criteria (This stock issue combines the definitive and designative issues outlined by Matlon, [1978]).

III. Value hierarchy and prioritization (Compare different, competitive values. Adapt the comparison to the critic or audience.)

IV. Topicality (Justify the interpretation of the resolution as a correct interpretation.)

These four stock issues appropriately broaden value proposition analysis beyond the definitive-designative model, and may serve as a formula for the future.

These four essays are only some of the ways in which theory has been advanced for determining appropriate issues for propositions of value. I am pleased to note that generically applied stock issues are still in the forefront of our thought, inasmuch as such issues have been useful for centuries in guiding our students in critical analysis. Unfortunately, all of this theory advancement has not led participants in CEDA into any commonly accepted ground regarding the model of ideal value debate.

Problems in CEDA's Approach to Value Debate

Two pervasive and interrelated issue analysis problems persist in CEDA debate rounds. These two problems seem to stem from a lack of a clear mission for CEDA, and the myth that its current mission is to foster value debate.

First, most CEDA debates on so-called propositions of value have actually become debates on propositions of quasi-policy. Even though I noted in 1978 that "value propositions are . . . intertwined with attitudes about policies insofar as they often lead to or are embedded in policy suggestions" (p. 195), I neither imagined nor wished that CEDA debate would focus on "policy suggestions." Nevertheless, it has. On the surface, an "examination, of the terminology used in the activity would lead one to conclude that CEDA is actually value debate" (Shea, 1987, p. 3). However, debating about values "has rarely been the case in terms of the resolutions chosen or the debaters' approach to the resolutions" (Thomas, 1987, p. 448). The propositions selected are commonly referred to, not as value topics, but as quasi-policy resolutions, that is, resolutions which contain implicit plans or courses of action (Dixon & Leslie, 1984).

Let us look at some examples. "Resolved: that the United States is justified in providing military support to nondemocratic governments" caused CEDA debaters in 1985 to examine and evaluate past and current U.S. policy (Millsap & Millsap, 1985). "Resolved: that the American judicial system has overemphasized freedom of the press" in 1988 called for policy examples from affirmatives versus disadvantages of policy discontinuance from the negative. So-called pseudo-disadvantages or pseudo-counterwarrants to implied plans (Bartanen, 1982) are termed value manifestations (Vasilius, 1980) or value objections. Under the 1981 resolution that activism in politics by religious

groups harms the American political process, negative teams examined the traditional policy stock issue of cost by citing future examples of value-induced behavior (e.g., religious groups would cease their positive contributions to civil rights and race riots would develop) (Dempsey, 1984). Other times, analysis shifts to the policy stock issue of cure or workability (Bartanen & Frank, 1983). With the 1981 proposition that unauthorized immigration into the United States is seriously detrimental to the United States, negatives were prompted to raise value (plan) objections such as borders can never be effectively shut off (Bartanen, 1982). In addition, the policy stock issue of ill (significance of the problem) has become the affirmative's "justification" of the value (Zeuschner & Hill, 1981).

A clear line between value-oriented arguments and policy-oriented arguments is almost impossible to draw. And, there is not much evidence anywhere that CEDA students will abandon their fascination with policy implications in value propositions (Dudczak, 1983). Several debate coaches in CEDA are encouraging their debaters to analytically approach value resolutions as debating propositions of quasi-policy.[2] Consider the following remarks:

> A debater confronting a value proposition need not begin in a state of confusion. Since value propositions are intricately woven into policy decisions, comparable issue analysis may be appropriate. The traditional policy stock issues of ill, blame, cure, and cost have an application . . . (Brownlee, 1980, p. 44)

> Value Benefits Analysis . . . is very similar to that which is already established in the policy debate arena. Quite simply, Value Benefits are to value oriented debating like Comparative Advantages are to policies. . . . The Value Benefits Analysis recognizes the legitimacy of paralleling Comparative Advantages as a clear, straightforward, and realistic/rational paradigm for seeking adherence to a value claim. (Zeuschner, 1982, p. 16)

> Because value judgments are the basis for policy implementation, consideration of values is independent upon policy directions; thus a need exists to examine values in a conditional or hypothetical policy realm. . . . When arguing values in terms of action, the policy-making paradigm should be the only model used to debate value propositions. (Jones & Crawford, 1984, pp. 11, 12)

> The proponents of value debate have been too hasty in rejecting the traditional stock issues. The questions contained in them apply not only to policy but also to the implied policy proposals found in "value" topics. (Rowland, 1983, p. 828)

> We believe that a viable affirmative method of fulfilling its responsibilities is what we term the "Policy Implications" affirmative. Basically, the affirmative offers a prima-facie case in support of a value or value system, consistent with that required by the resolution (the definitive stock issue). The justification for the value system, the designative stock issue, is grounded in the system's beneficial policy implications. (Young & Gaske, 1984, p. 26)

> Attempts to separate value propositions from policy propositions created, at best, a limitation upon the advocate to the discovery of the full range of potential issues available to the consideration of the value in question. . . . Decision rules created by . . . value arguments require a manifestation in policy in order to be meaningful. (Dudczak, 1983, pp. 837, 838)

Two consequences are created by saying that CEDA is value debate, and then

choosing propositions of quasi-policy. Both of these consequences hurt our ability to teach newcomers an analytical formula for success in CEDA debating. First, debaters are left in limbo as to how far they should go with their policy analysis in a quasi-policy/value debate. On one hand, several judges (especially those who either vigorously oppose anything that NDT practices and/or who want values debated only in the abstract with no hint of policy) punish debaters for making policy overtones. "The belief appears to exist among some judges of CEDA that value propositions and policy propositions are separable" (Dudczak, 1983, p. 838). On the other hand, as I will develop shortly, debating values in the abstract may be too difficult for most of our students. Policy analysis is a well-defined formula on which they can rely. The result is a tendency for many of the debaters to go into policy implications half-heartedly, while, at the same time, offering a watered-down analysis of values. More will be said about their analysis of values shortly.

Next, when CEDA propositions are debated in the abstract as pure value resolutions by one side, and debated as quasi-policy matters by the other side, a lack of clash ensues. With the 1983 CEDA proposition, "Resolved, that individual rights of privacy are more important than any other Constitutional right," some affirmative teams favorably weighed the value of this right along a value hierarchy, while some negative teams condemned specific actions such as bans on strip searches and inquiries into prior sexual history in rape trials (Dixon & Leslie, 1984). Two quite different lines of argumentation created confusion for all involved. In sum, the quasi-policy approach to value argumentation has created a loss of focus for the purpose of CEDA activity.

Second, there is no in-depth value analysis encouraged by debating quasi-policy topics. When I argued earlier for the adoption of value propositions (1978), I hoped that debaters would familiarize themselves with the works of philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists who wrote about values and value hierarchies. Landmark literature by Kluckhohn (1958), Parsons and Shils (1962), Williams (1970), and Rokeach (1981) serves as historical introduction to American values. In my 1981 essay, I argued that questions of ethics and morals would encourage our forensic students to chart new territory. I said that propositions such as "courage is not an admirable trait" and "people have no inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" were suitable resolutions to introduce our students to metaethics and value inquiry.

Others shared my view. Boggs (1987) posits that CEDA students must explore interdisciplinary literature to search for standards to resolve value conflict, standards such as social values, exigence and salience, anteriority, cost/benefit, and oughtness or normative value. Having debaters incorporate such standards of right and wrong into debate rounds would "increase the amount of value clash in non-policy debates" (Boggs, 1987, p. 32). Ulrich (1983) argues that "debaters should read Mill, Rawls, and Dworkin to develop a framework for analyzing values, and they should realize the implications of these theorists in debate rounds" (p. 25). He goes on to say that debaters should clearly outline the ethical, political, or social systems that they wish to defend, explaining what the system is and why the system is being used in a particular round. To do so effectively,

the debaters must be knowledgeable in the history and philosophy of values.

Unfortunately, "it appears that all too few debaters have followed Matlon's advice, as most non-policy debaters include, at most, a superficial exposition and support of value comparison standards" (Boggs, 1987, p. 27). Too often, CEDA debaters "do little more than determine the relevant values implicit in the resolution and then proceed to argue which value sets are more important. The problem with this view is that it oversimplifies the nature of value controversies" (Herbeck & Wong, 1986, p. 18). There is little historical, philosophical, or theoretical understanding of value inquiry being displayed in rounds of CEDA debate.

As noted earlier, the problem stems from the wording of the propositions and the lack of a clearly defined mission for CEDA activity since the organization has not made a solid commitment to debating serious questions of ethics and morals. What, then, can be done about the mission of CEDA and the ongoing problems in debating quasi-policy topics instead of authentic value propositions? The answer to this question is addressed in the section which follows.

Where Do We Go from Here?

The centerpiece of this essay has been the debate proposition itself. Indeed, it is time for CEDA to closely examine its choice of propositions. At present, the proposition selections have placed CEDA activity in a sort of never-never land. Although I think a considerable amount of time and thought are needed to word clear-cut propositions of value, policy, or fact, and that some propositions never clearly fall into one of these three categories, I believe that this time-tested trichotomy still has merit. Therefore, I will use this classification scheme and argue that there are three possible paths to follow. They are:

1. Attempt to debate authentic propositions of value.
2. Resume debating propositions of policy.
3. Begin debating propositions of fact.

Let us consider each alternative in turn.

Should CEDA attempt to debate propositions of value? I am going to waffle in answering this question, although I lean toward a "probably not" reply. The theoretical essays which were discussed in the first section of the paper and the references on values noted in the second section of this paper hold promise that some day there can be a clear paradigm for teaching our students how to analyze and argue value resolutions. However, to be realistic, it may be unreasonable to expect novice debaters or even most experienced students of debate to understand that vast body of literature on values so they can be articulate value philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists. Perhaps this is the reason CEDA has been unable to make a wholehearted commitment to value debate on behalf of its student participants.

Even if our students could be taught how to analyze authentic value propostions, not quasi-policy topics, another serious problem with value resolutions exists. Presump-

tion is nearly impossible to locate. Numerous writers, CEDA coaches, and students have groped with the slippery task of locating presumption in rounds of debate where genuine propositions of value are used, only to find the concept quite elusive. Because presumption is the yardstick debate judges should use to award a decision to an affirmative or a negative team, it is essential that the concept be clarified.[3] But, can this be done?

First, a jurisprudential definition of presumption (innocent until proven guilty) is inapplicable to values and counter-values. How can a value like democracy be "innocent" or "guilty?" Second, a "status quo" or "existing institutions" definition of presumption is nearly impossible to locate because of the shortcomings of public opinion polls and the vague notion of what constitutes prevailing popular or unpopular opinion. Third, the hypothesis-testing notion of presumption which is the rule that it rests against the resolution (Podgurski, 1983), is arbitrary and artificial. Consider the Spring, 1984 CEDA proposition, "Resolved: That federal government censorship is justified to defend the national security of the United States." Does this not seem like this is a presumptive statement? Why should presumption be artificially placed against that statement? Fourth, the natural notion of presumption is that it can float from debate round to debate round. This definition affixes presumption in the mind of each judge. Unfortunately, this approach falsely assumes that debaters are able to know and understand each judge's value system prior to and during a debate. In a debate over abortion, does the judge in the back of the room hold a pro-life, pro-choice, or neutral view? Who knows? So, I am persuaded that floating (natural) presumption is equally unworkable for academic debate.

To summarize, "the overall impact on the conduct and critical evaluation of CEDA debate is lessened by the failure to attain agreement of what the locus of presumption is in value inquiry" (Young & Gaske, 1984, p. 25). Setting aside presumption entirely is a possible way out. But, what do we have then? What rule or standard is used by judges to resolve a very close debate? Again, a dilemma ensues. On one hand, the concept of presumption cannot be used to "break ties." On the other hand, no substitute concept or guideline has been offered.

The difficulties of probing the vast and difficult body of value literature and locating presumption with authentic propositions of value cause me to have reservations about making value debate the primary mission of CEDA at this time. Although attempting to debate authentic value propositions is not my preferred alternative, if such propositions are the focus of CEDA, they ought to be as far removed from quasi-policy wording as possible. Purer value propositions such as, "Resolved, that democracy is more important than life," or "Resolved, that courage is not an admirable trait" are superior from the standpoint of value analysis than adoption of a quasi-policy proposition such as, "Resolved, that the United States is justified in providing military support to nondemocratic governments."

Should CEDA resume debating propositions of policy? Yes, because that is essentially what is happening in CEDA now. Why hold back with quasi-policy, translated as "seeming to be" policy? Why not go all the way? We have a clear set of stock-issue guidelines for analyzing and evaluating policy debate. Furthermore, values can be debated within the context of policy resolutions. As Rowland (1983) correctly noted, "there is little need for an independent form of debate concerning values, because values are integral to policies" (p. 829). Policies can be evaluated rationally not only by examining their effects, but also by delving into their underlying values. Numerous authors, many of whom have been cited here, have given us guidelines for exploring value and value hierarchy analysis which can be used to enrich policy argumentation. For example, the affirmative debater who builds a crucial comparative advantage issue or the negative debater who builds a crucial comparative disadvantage issue around the value of freedom can indeed use what has been written about values to deepen the philosophical underpinnings of their claims.

Gross (1984), an advocate of CEDA adopting policy propositions, believes that CEDA's 1982 proposition, "Resolved that a unilateral freeze by the United States on nuclear weapons production and development would be desirable" would have been a clearer topic if it had been worded, "Resolved, that the United States should adopt a unilateral freeze on the production and development of nuclear weapons." The latter wording, "would have forced the affirmative team to commit itself to a particular program . . . [rather than taking] refuge in studied ambiguities about what it was they endorsed" (p. 8). It is through specific policy proposals that the concept of nuclear freeze takes on meaning.

Adopting policy propositions does not mean CEDA must abandon any commitment to advancing our knowledge about how to argue values. If CEDA moves in this direction, its concern must be with this question: "How can we get policy debaters to do more with underlying values?" The answer is found in wording policy propositions which contain clear value implications. Constitutional rights propositions are good. So are those which address some of these questions raised by Pfau, Thomas, and Ulrich (1987): "Is law and order more important than justice? Is the right to a fair trial more important than freedom of the press? Is the protection of the environment more important than economic growth?" (p. 24). Value inquiries such as these can lead to policy propositions such as, "Resolved: that protection of the environment should take precedence over economic growth."

Not only can value analysis be encouraged by CEDA when carefully worded policy propositions are adopted, but many of the ambiguities created by debating value or quasi-policy questions can dissolve. For reasons cited earlier, debating concrete ideas is superior to debating abstract constructs. Therefore, the mission of CEDA might be to encourage debates over concrete and focused policy systems which are deepened by in-depth considerations of underlying values and value hierarchies.

Should CEDA begin debating propositions of fact? Definitely. I ought to begin this discussion by identifying what a proposition of fact is. Propositions of fact help us discover what "is" or "is not;" whereas propositions of value discover "good" and "bad." The proposition of fact that "the cost of higher education is the major reason most

people do not attend or drop out of college" measures "is/existence" or "is not/non-existence;" the proposition of value that "it is wrong to charge students so much money for higher education" measures "good/right" or "bad/wrong." The first of the two propositions above is a proposition of fact because it "describes a view of reality.... The purpose of the [proposition] ... is to establish whether the stated description [of reality] is correct" (Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983, p. 16). The "correctness" of this view of reality can be measured and tested empirically. Meanwhile, while we may in part rely on empirical information to judge the "right" or "wrong" of something, empirical data alone will not suffice when examining values. The opinions of philosophers and an understanding of individual and societal wants and needs also matters.

Propositions of fact may examine the past, present, or future. Juries look at claims of past fact (what happened) when they consider propositions such as, "John Doe is guilty of first degree murder." Economists argue claims of present fact (what is happening) when they consider propositions such as, "The rate of inflation is increasing." People with political interests frequently debate claims of future fact (what will happen) when they consider propositions such as, "Jesse Jackson will be elected President in 1996."

Many propositions of fact are also identified as historical or scientific in nature. "The historian attempts to interpret events within the framework of some explanation; the scientist, to interpret phenomena by reference to some theoretical structure" (Zarefsky, 1980, pp. 11-12). In these cases, historians and scientists are trying to discover meaning (what something means) with propositions like, "Resolved, that Lyndon Johnson's `War on Poverty' exacerbated the problems of poverty in the United States," or "Resolved, that computers will alter the course of civilization." Notice, again, that the focus of these propositions is on "is, was, or will be," not "good, bad."

If CEDA participants debated non-policy propositions of fact, many of the problems faced by debating propositions of value or quasi-policy might be overcome. In-depth fact analysis may be more within the reach of our students than in-depth value analysis. As one observer notes: "Propositions of fact ... are often easy to understand since the advocate of the proposition needs only to demonstrate the existence of certain facts to `prove' her case to the audience" (Tuman, 1986, p. 86). Fact analysis requires empirical and authoritative validation; value analysis requires a comprehensive understanding of philosophy, sociology, and psychology. The former is more concrete; the latter is more abstract. Presumption may also be somewhat easier to locate with propositions of fact than propositions of value, especially if the framers of the propositions remain cognizant of what is generally presumed to be ("true").

In addition, debating propositions of fact may give us a fuller understanding of how the definitive and designative stock issues work. These two general and fundamental issues are certainly as endemic to fact resolutions as they are to value resolutions. With the definitive stock issue, we would ask: "What criteria are available to justify the fact (assess the degree of truth) claimed in the proposition?" With the designative stock issue, we would ask: "Does the fact claimed in the proposition conform to the criteria?"

Here are some examples:

Proposition: Sam is guilty of loitering.
Definitive Issue: What constitutes loitering? (What criteria do we use to determine when loitering has taken place?)
Designative Issue: Did Sam loiter? (Does Sam's action conform to the definition of loitering?)

Proposition: Capital punishment will deter crime.
Definitive Issue: What constitutes a deterrence in crime?
Designative Issue: Will capital punishment cause such a deterrence?

Proposition: The two-party system is dead in America.
Definitive Issue: What would make death an appropriate characterization of the two-party system?
Designative Issue: Are these conditions satisfied (Zarefsky, 1980, p. 14)?

Zarefsky (1980) shows how potential issues flow from these two stock issues with the following proposition, although I do not think this is a particularly well-balanced resolution:

Proposition: Jimmy Carter received stronger political support than Gerald Ford.
Definitive Issue: What constitutes support?
Potential Issues:
1. Number of voters
2. Intensity of partisan feeling
3. Independence of voters
4. Positive effect
5. Etc.

Designative Issue: Did Carter have stronger political support than Ford?
Potential Issues:
1. Carter vs. Ford regarding number of votes
2. Carter vs. Ford regarding intensity of partisan feeling
3. Carter vs. Ford regarding independence of voters
4. Carter vs. Ford regarding positive effect
5. Etc.

Some of these potential issues may never be raised by either side in the debate; they become waived issues. Some of these potential issues may be introduced by one side and agreed to by the opposition; they become admitted issues. Some of these potential issues remain points of disagreement by the affirmative and the negative throughout the debate; they become actual issues or points of clash. For example, an affirmative team might say "intensity of partisan feeling constitutes political support," and the negative may admit to this issue. However, when the affirmative goes on to say that "Carter

generated more intensity of partisan feeling among Democrats than Ford did with the Republicans," the negative might disagree and we have clash. Additional steps inthe analysis of fact propositions are discussed in a variety of sources, one of which is found in Chapter 8 of Rybacki and Rybacki (1986).

Several propositions of fact for CEDA have already been suggested in this essay. Those propositions, as well as other possibilities for CEDA debate, are listed below:

Resolved, that the cost of higher education is the major reason most people do not attend or drop out of college.

Resolved, that "John Doe" (some accused and well-known person coming to trial after the debate season is over) is guilty of first degree murder.

Resolved, that the rate of inflation is increasing.

Resolved, that Jesse Jackson will be elected President in 1996.

Resolved, that Lyndon Johnson's 'War on Poverty' exacerbated the problem of poverty in the United States.

Resolved, that computers will alter the course of civilization.

Resolved, that capital punishment deters crime.

Resolved, that the two-party system is dead in America.

Resolved, that flying saucers exist.

Resolved, that the American mass media is relatively free from government regulation.

Resolved, that granting tuition tax credits to the parents of children who attend private schools will perpetuate segregation.

Resolved, that violence on television causes violent behavior in children.

Resolved, that Lee Harvey Oswald killed President John Kennedy.

Resolved, that the stock market will collapse within a decade.

Numerous other possibilities exist. If CEDA wants to be in the forefront of generating theories of argument, its mission might be to turn to propositions of fact. Such a mission offers an exciting, yet realistic, challenge for coaches and debaters alike.

Of course, a fourth alternative mission is always possible. CEDA could adopt the practice of debating propositions of fact, value, and policy on a rotational basis. This alternative has merit, too. It gives everyone some variety, and it permits needed growth and development in all three areas of argumentative analysis. If this course of action was followed, the CEDA topic committee would probably want to issue resolutional parameters indicating to the debaters and coaches what type(s) of proposition(s) are being offered. In any case, CEDA is at an important crossroads in its mission, and the focus of that mission ought to be on proposition designation.

In 1978, I and others urged that propositions of value be argued in academic forensics. CEDA attempted to pick up that challenge, and we have learned much about

value analysis in the process. Unfortunately, in the process, CEDA losts its sense of direction by claiming to be the perpetrator of value debate, while resisting major changes away from policy debate. Now, the time has come for the leaders of CEDA to clearly articulate the purpose of the organization's existence. Now might be the ideal time to forge ahead by seeing if (a) value argument can be advanced within the context of a pure policy paradigm, and (b) we can refine our knowledge of the definitive and designative stock issues by debating propositions of fact. I believe that to embark on either or both missions could initiate a noteworthy dialog on debate theory and practice from which everyone in forensics can benefit. I look forward to another interesting decade ahead.

Notes

[1] Sincere appreciation is expressed to my colleague, Brenda Logue, for valuable input into the preparation of this manuscript.

[2] The National Forensic League adopted a Lincoln-Douglas format as a national high school tournament event in 1980. Unlike CEDA, the NFL established a rule that only value propositions could be debated, and the debaters could not use the policy stock issues for their analysis, although no alternative analytical approach was suggested.

[3] The assumption here is that debates should be won by somebody. An alternative assumption, namely, that non-policy debates can be judged as a tie is offered by Thomas (1987).

References

Bartanen, M. (1987). Application of the issues-agenda paradigm to speaker duties and stock issues in value debates. *CEDA Yearbook, 8*, 42-51.

Bartanen, M. (1982). The role of values in policy controversies. *CEDA Yearbook, 3*, 19-24.

Bartanen, M., & Frank , D. (1983). Creating procedural distinctions between values and policy debate: The issues-agenda model. *The Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta, 69*, 1-9.

Boggs, R. (1987). Comparing values: A review of axiological standards for analytical value hierarchies. *CEDA Yearbook, 8*, 27-32.

Brownlee, D. (1980). Advocacy and values. *CEDA Yearbook , 1*, 43-47.

Brownlee, D. (1987). Approaches to the evaluation of criteria. *CEDA Yearbook, 8*, 59-63.

Dempsey, R. (1984). The theoretical illegitimacy of speculative value objections. *CEDA Yearbook, 5*, 60-64.

Dixon, T., & Leslie, C. (1984). Propositional analysis: A need for focus in CEDA debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 5*, 16-23.

Dudczak, C. (1983). Value argument in a competitve setting: An inhibition to ordinary language use. In D. Zarefsky, M. Sillars & J. Rhodes (Eds.), *Argument in transition : Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 837-843). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Gross, B. (1984). A case for debating propositions of policy. *CEDA Yearbook, 5*, 7-10.

Herbeck, D., & Wong, K. (1986). The indivisibility of value claims from policy positions: An argument for policy in value debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 7*, 14-28.

Jones, M., & Crawford, S. (1984). Justification of values in terms of action: A rationale for a modified policy-making paradigm in value debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 5*, 11-15.

Kluckhohn, C. (1958). *Mirror for Man.* New York: Whittlesey House.
Matlon, R. (1978). Debating propositions of value. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14*, 194-204.
Matlon, R. (1981). Propositions of value: An inquiry into issue analysis and the locus of presumption. In G. Ziegelmueller & J. Rhodes (Eds.), *Dimensions of argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 494-512). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.
Millsap, S., & Millsap, S. (1985). Reflections on solvency in quasi-policy propositions. *CEDA Yearbook, 6*, 29-31.
Parsons, T., & Shils, E. (1962). *Toward a general theory of action.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Patterson, J., & Zarefsky, D. (1983). *Contemporary debate.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Pfau, M., Thomas, D., & Ulrich, W. (1987). *Debate and argument: A systems approach to advocacy.* Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
Podgurski, D. (1983). Presumption in the value proposition realm. *CEDA Yearbook, 4*, 34-39.
Rokeach, M. (1981). *The nature of human values.* London: Free Press.
Rowland, R. (1983). The philosophical presuppositions of value debate. In D. Zarefsky, M. Sillars, & J. Rhodes (Eds.), *Argument in transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 822-836). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.
Rybacki, K., & Rybacki, D. (1986). *Advocacy and opposition: An introduction to argumentation.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Shea, B.C. (1987, November). *The language of CEDA.* Paper presented at the meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Boston, MA.
Thomas, D. (1987). Presumption in non-policy debate: A case for natural presumption based on current non-policy paradigms. In D. Thomas & J. Hart (Eds.), *Advanced debate: Readings in theory, practice, and teaching* (pp. 448-468). Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook.
Tomlinson, J. (1983). The philosophy and development of CEDA. *CEDA Yearbook, 4*, 1-5.
Tuman, J. (1987). Getting to first base: Prima facie arguments for propositions of value. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 24*, 84-94.
Vasilius, J. (1980). Value proposition debate: A pragmatic approach. *CEDA Yearbook, 1*, 49-59.
Verch, S., & Logue, B. (1982). Increasing value clash: A propositional and structural approach. *CEDA Yearbook, 3*, 25-28.
Ulrich, W. (1983). Philosophical systems as paradigms for value debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 4*, 22-28.
Williams, R. (1970). *American society: A sociological interpretation.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Young, G., & Gaske, P. (1984). On prima-facie value argumentation: The policy implications affirmative. *CEDA Yearbook, 5*, 24-30.
Zarefsky, D. (1980). Criteria for evaluating non-policy argument. *CEDA Yearbook, 1*, 9-16.
Zeuschner, R. (1982). Value benefits analysis as an affirmative paradigm. *CEDA Yearbook, 3*, 16-18.
Zeuschner, R., & Hill, C. (1981). Psychological presumption: Its place in value topic debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 2*, 20-24.

INHERENCY AS A STOCK ISSUE IN NON-POLICY PROPOSITIONS

Craig A. Dudczak
Syracuse University

The development of alternative perspectives to debate theory and practice has left a void in the status of several traditional debate concepts. Often in their interest to distance non-policy propositions from policy counterparts, writers on debate theory have used new metaphors or models of argument to illustrate value propositions.

One traditional debate concept which has been largely ignored is the issue of inherency (Dudczak, 1987). Whether this is an intentional exclusion or coincidental omission, the failure to address the issue of inherency leaves an analytical void in the consideration of a proposition. Inherency asks the question whether an element has a necessary, intrinsic, or essential relationship within a larger system. It is proposed that "Inherency is inherent to debate" regardless of propositional form or format. In developing this thesis I will examine the nature of inherency as an analytic concept and apply it to the emerging non-policy propositional formats.

The Nature of Inherency

Random House (1966) defines "inherent" as "existing in something as a permanent and inseparable element, quality, or attribute" (p. 732). Thomas and Hart (1987) use the description "the state of being an intrinsic, inseparable, necessary part of the present system" in the glossary of *Advanced Debate* (p. 552), while Wood and Midgley (1986) refer to inherency as "any intrinsic characteristics" (p. 186). Central to the definitions is the characteristic of an enduring attribute. Something is inherent because it bears some constant relationship to another thing. A consistent relationship—an inherency—exists as a function of an analytic construct. The propositional form expressing an inherent relationship is incidental. "Grass is green" (fact), "Green is good" (value), or "Green should be our national color" (policy) each assumes one or more inherencies. While the specific type of inherency issues may vary based upon the propositional type, the possibility of discovering an inherency issue is not limited to a single type of proposition.

Our thinking about inherency has been shaded by its association with policy propositions. The most limiting effect of this policy association has been to link inherency with an implied requirement for a plan to solve an existing problem. Inherency was most often seen as the imputed relationship between the effect of a proposed action upon a problem. Smith and Hunsaker (1972) state inherency asked whether a problem required a new remedy (p. 41). Goodnight, Balthrop, and Parson (1974) structured inherency as either the "barrier" blocking action or the "gap" created by the failure to authorize action (pp. 232-234). The shift to a "Policy Paradigm" located problems in a future advantage, but retained a focus on whether a plan achieved a predicted effect. So when Brock (1974) observed that inherency showed whether aspects