Kluckhohn, C. (1958). *Mirror for Man*. New York: Whittlesey House.

Matlon, R. (1978). Debating propositions of value. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14*, 194-204.

Matlon, R. (1981). Propositions of value: An inquiry into issue analysis and the locus of presumption. In G. Ziegelmueller & J. Rhodes (Eds.), *Dimensions of argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 494-512). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Millsap, S., & Millsap, S. (1985). Reflections on solvency in quasi-policy propositions. *CEDA Yearbook, 6*, 29-31.

Parsons, T. , & Shils, E. (1962). *Toward a general theory of action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Patterson, J., & Zarefsky, D. (1983). *Contemporary debate*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Pfau, M., Thomas, D., & Ulrich, W. (1987). *Debate and argument: A systems approach to advocacy*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Podgurski, D. (1983). Presumption in the value proposition realm. *CEDA Yearbook, 4*, 34-39.

Rokeach, M. (1981). *The nature of human values*. London: Free Press.

Rowland, R. (1983). The philosophical presuppositions of value debate. In D. Zarefsky, M. Sillars, & J. Rhodes (Eds.), *Argument in transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 822-836). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Rybacki, K., & Rybacki, D. (1986). *Advocacy and opposition: An introduction to argumentation*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Shea, B.C. (1987, November). *The language of CEDA*. Paper presented at the meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Boston, MA.

Thomas, D. (1987). Presumption in non-policy debate: A case for natural presumption based on current non-policy paradigms. In D. Thomas & J. Hart (Eds.), *Advanced debate: Readings in theory, practice, and teaching* (pp. 448-468). Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook.

Tomlinson, J. (1983). The philosophy and development of CEDA. *CEDA Yearbook, 4*, 1-5.

Tuman, J. (1987). Getting to first base: Prima facie arguments for propositions of value. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 24*, 84-94.

Vasilius, J. (1980). Value proposition debate: A pragmatic approach. *CEDA Yearbook, 1*, 49-59.

Verch, S., & Logue, B. (1982). Increasing value clash: A propositional and structural approach. *CEDA Yearbook, 3*, 25-28.

Ulrich, W. (1983). Philosophical systems as paradigms for value debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 4*, 22-28.

Williams, R. (1970). *American society: A sociological interpretation*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Young, G., & Gaske, P. (1984). On prima-facie value argumentation: The policy implications affirmative. *CEDA Yearbook, 5*, 24-30.

Zarefsky, D. (1980). Criteria for evaluating non-policy argument. *CEDA Yearbook, 1*, 9-16.

Zeuschner, R. (1982). Value benefits analysis as an affirmative paradigm. *CEDA Yearbook, 3*, 16-18.

Zeuschner, R., & Hill, C. (1981). Psychological presumption: Its place in value topic debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 2*, 20-24.

INHERENCY AS A STOCK ISSUE IN NON-POLICY PROPOSITIONS

Craig A. Dudczak

Syracuse University

The development of alternative perspectives to debate theory and practice has left a void in the status of several traditional debate concepts. Often in their interest to distance non-policy propositions from policy counterparts, writers on debate theory have used new metaphors or models of argument to illustrate value propositions.

One traditional debate concept which has been largely ignored is the issue of inherency (Dudczak, 1987). Whether this is an intentional exclusion or coincidental omission, the failure to address the issue of inherency leaves an analytical void in the consideration of a proposition. Inherency asks the question whether an element has a necessary, intrinsic, or essential relationship within a larger system. It is proposed that "Inherency is inherent to debate" regardless of propositional form or format. In developing this thesis I will examine the nature of inherency as an analytic concept and apply it to the emerging non-policy propositional formats.

The Nature of Inherency

Random House (1966) defines "inherent" as "existing in something as a permanent and inseparable element, quality, or attribute" (p. 732). Thomas and Hart (1987) use the description "the state of being an intrinsic, inseparable, necessary part of the present system" in the glossary of *Advanced Debate* (p. 552), while Wood and Midgley (1986) refer to inherency as "any intrinsic characteristics" (p. 186). Central to the definitions is the characteristic of an enduring attribute. Something is inherent because it bears some constant relationship to another thing. A consistent relationship—an inherency—exists as a function of an analytic construct. The propositional form expressing an inherent relationship is incidental. "Grass is green" (fact), "Green is good" (value), or "Green should be our national color" (policy) each assumes one or more inherencies. While the specific type of inherency issues may vary based upon the propositional type, the possibility of discovering an inherency issue is not limited to a single type of proposition.

Our thinking about inherency has been shaded by its association with policy propositions. The most limiting effect of this policy association has been to link inherency with an implied requirement for a plan to solve an existing problem. Inherency was most often seen as the imputed relationship between the effect of a proposed action upon a problem. Smith and Hunsaker (1972) state inherency asked whether a problem required a new remedy (p. 41). Goodnight, Balthrop, and Parson (1974) structured inherency as either the "barrier" blocking action or the "gap" created by the failure to authorize action (pp. 232-234). The shift to a "Policy Paradigm" located problems in a future advantage, but retained a focus on whether a plan achieved a predicted effect. So when Brock (1974) observed that inherency showed whether aspects

of a plan were basic to a resolution (p. 2), or Schunk (1978) opined that the "real nature of inherency" was whether we could solve the problem without adopting the resolution (p. 147), they reinforced the impression that the issue of inherency was tied to the solvency of a plan. This is a narrow view of inherency.

Inherency certainly may include a "causal analysis" of whether a particular plan will result in a predicted effect. One needs to identify underlying reasons why a given policy doesn't work in order to assess the feasibility of alternatives (Cherwitz & Hikins, 1977). But inherency is not limited to the evaluation of plan consequences, either good or bad. Rather, inherencies operate at all levels of issues analysis with the inherency of a plan being but one level.

In its broader sense, an inherency is any in which two or more elements are said to be in constant relationship to each other. This relationship may be causal, sign, or lexical. Each of these relationships is an analytic construct which is applicable to any propositional form. As analytic constructs, inherencies are inferential. An inherency is "proven" much as a causal inference is proven—by a form of hypothesis-testing using standards of consistency, parsimony, and fidelity.

In policy propositions, the focus had evolved to ask whether the proposed policy (plan) would produce the claimed effects—hence, the focus on inherency as a function of plan outcomes. But in order to make statements about the effect of a plan, one needed to describe the system and its ongoing relationships. Fail to adequately describe the existing state of being, and you won't understand it. Fail to understand it, and you can't make reliable predictions about the new consequences created by the plan (Brock, Chesebro, Cragan, & Klumpp,1973, pp. 98-99). To the extent that plan predictions are dependent upon the inherent features of the underlying system, inherency issues remain prior to and separate from consideration of the plan. An example may help to illustrate inherency issues within each propositional type.

The proposition of fact, "The Sandinistas are Marxist," allows at least three possible inherency issues. Two involve the respective definitional meanings of "Sandinista" and "Marxist." Until the terms have have been stipulated by both sides, there cannot be meaningful discourse by either. As Brockriede (1975) noted, a defining characteristic of argument is "a frame of reference shared optimally" (p. 180). The third issue involved is the location of the category "Sandinista" within the designation "Marxist."

The value proposition, "Nicaragua threatens regional stability," may *both* designate inherency issues *within itself*, as well as *subsume* the inherency issues associated with underlying factual propositions. Potential inherency issues involved with this proposition include definitional issues for each respective term as well as causal analysis of whether political, military, or economic actions taken by the Nicaraguan regime constitute threats to one or more Central American countries. The factual proposition— Sandinistas are Marxists—may inform the resolution of the value term. In this sense, the factual proposition exists prior to and separate from the consideration of the value proposition. One may establish the inherency of the factual terms without the value proposition. Once the value proposition is introduced, however, the range of potential

inherency issues expands to include both those stated directly by the value proposition, as well as those assumed by the fact proposition.

Similarly, a policy proposition, "U.S. should terminate covert involvement in Central America," both creates new inherency issues while subsuming the inherencies associated with its underlying fact and value propositions. This is to say that the desirability of policy action is always dependent upon whether certain conditions exist—i.e., The Sandinistas are Marxists—as well as how those conditions are evaluated—i.e., Nicaragua (Sandinistas) threaten regional stability. Policy propositions *extend* inherency issues to include a consideration alternate solutions upon an existing situation. The inherencies attendant to the existing situation remain, however, regardless of whether we ever introduce a plan.

The point of this extended set of examples is to articulate the claim that inherency issues are not uniquely tied to policy propositions. Each propositional type has potential inherency issues associated with it. Viewed as a hierarchy, a policy proposition subsumes the inherencies of its subordinate value and factual parts in addition to new inherency issues it introduces. A value proposition may subsume the inherencies of its subordinate factual assumptions in addition to the new inherencies created by the values.

Types of Inherency Issues

Having claimed that inherency is relevant to all propositional types, the following attempts to delineate substantive issues which can be developed. One earlier piece applied Cherwitz and Hikins' (1977) Multidimensional Causal Model to Zarefsky's (1977) categorization of non-policy propositions (Dudczak, 1987, pp. 374-376). The present analysis of inherency moves from the "rhetorical" causation featured by Cherwitz and Hikins to language-based categories. The three categories—causal, sign, and lexical—are analytic.

The first category is causal inherency. "Causal" inherencies are always inferred (Zarefsky, 1977) insofar as they can never be directly observed. It is commonly understood that a causal link possesses the characteristics of 1) invariability, 2) chronology, and 3) proximity. Simply put, these three characteristics meant that to infer "cause," there had to be a consistent relationship of cause-effect, the causal element had to precede the effect in time, and there were no intervening variables which might have altered the cause.

The second sense in which causal analysis in inherency is proposition-invariant is based on a "systems" understanding of analysis. Brock, et al. (1973) explained that it may not be possible to determine a single element which "caused" the system's operation (p. 109). Rather, the "cause" might be the functional result of multiple interactions. This is to say that the cause is not a single element, but rather consists of the interaction of several elements. Accepting this as true only means that propositions of fact or value may, like their policy counterparts, be understood as having multiple causal elements which may

operate separately or in conjunction with each other to affect an outcome.

The inherency implication from multiple causal elements is to require a greater explanation for the causal sequence. In a simple cause-effect analysis—i.e., increased unemployment results in increased applications for social services—the account needed for the causal sequence is fairly straightforward. However, when the causal sequence involves multiple assumptions and contingencies—i.e., when unemployment and population density increase under the circumstance of decreased social services, then antisocial behavior becomes more likely—the need for explanation increases. Additionally, as the complexity of the causal model increases, it becomes more susceptible to indictment as each element of the model must be sustained to make the causal claim (Brock, et al., pp. 124-125).

Sign argument operates as inherency when an advocate alleges an invariable substance-attribute relationship. In effect, sign arguments ask us to infer the presence of one thing (the substance) which is usually unobserved (and may be unobservable) from the presence of an attribute (sign) which can be observed (Ziegelmueller & Dause, 1975, pp. 104-106). When the relationship between the substance and its attribute(s) is established, one meets the standard of constant association characteristic of an inherency. For example, it is common practice in the medical arts to offer a diagnosis based upon the presence (or absence) of symptoms (signs) associated with a disease. Of course, it is necessary to establish the invariance of the association, the sufficiency of the number of signs, and account for any contradictory signs which may exist. Meeting these tests allows one to claim an inherency.

Sign arguments are differentiated from causal arguments as inherencies. Causal arguments allege to give an account for the existence or essence of an event sufficient to have produced it—i.e., lightning causes thunder. Sign arguments, on the other hand, represent attributes associated with the existence of some substance, but which do not *account for* the existence or essence—i.e., fever is a sign of the flu. (Ziegelmueller & Dause, p. 108).

In propositions of fact, sign arguments may be used to confirm the existence of a phenomenon. No one may have seen "John Doe" at the crime scene, yet his fingerprints may be taken as proof of his previous presence. If the attributes are sufficient and necessary to establish an invariable relationship with some person, event, or other phenomenon, then the signs may establish the factual condition without the event ever having been directly observed.

Similarly, signs operate in propositions of value most directly through the relationship between value goals and their criteria. The criteria exist in the same relationship to a goal as do signs in relation to their substance. Freedom of press exists as a terminal value which is "measured" by the presence or absence of "sign" indicators. So "censorship" becomes an observable sign of the existence of free press. Libel operates as another sign of a free press. Presumably, the press is more free when the likelihood of libel is diminished. When one argues about criteria and their relationship to a goal, one is advancing an inherency argument.

Finally, lexical arguments operate as inherency when they establish a constant association about the relationship between two or more terms. An advocate, having defined terms in an acceptable manner, bears some obligation to use them consistent with the definition. This requirement for consistent usage as an inherency should not be confused with topicality arguments. Topicality is an issue of jurisdiction imposed by the resolution (Pfau, Thomas & Ulrich, 1987, p. 153). The lexical inherency issue is independent of jurisdiction. It is not asking whether the affirmative (or negative) definition is best or reasonable. Rather, it argues that once a term has been defined, either directly or operationally, its subsequent use should be consistent with the definition.

Examples of lexical inherency arise through ambiguity, amphiboly, figures, accent, equivocation, quibbling or the division of an issue into "black and white" (Fischer, 1970, pp. 265-281). The inconsistent use of language violates the context of definition when applied in another sense or meaning. For instance, the expression "Truth is relative, but none of my relatives is truthful," ambiguates the two senses in which the term "relative" is used. Either sense of the word may be appropriate, but not when used together. In debate the issue of lexical consistency usually occurs when an advocate establishes one standard of meaning for the term, and then uses evidence which fails to use the term in the same context.

Propositions of fact or value require consistency in meaning when using evidence and reasoning to support the proposition. For instance, were an affirmative to argue "Poverty is harmful" using a definition of poverty on a minimum income criterion—i.e., less than $10,000 for a family of four—it would violate its own definition by introducing evidence which referred to poverty as a "quality of life" regardless of income. The point is that the operational system assumed for the purposes of the claim violates inherency when it changes meaning to read evidence assuming a different meaning. This would normally be categorized as the fallacy of equivocation (Copi, 1978, pp. 110-112).

The causal, sign, and lexical applications of inherency make them relevant to the analysis of non-policy propositions. The following suggests the manner in which inherency arguments may be applied to propositions of fact and value, although they would be equally appropriate to policy propositions.

Applications to Non-Policy Debate

The focus of inherency is placed upon the question of whether a consistent, intrinsic relationship exists between two or more elements within a system. Unlike traditional policy applications of inherency which feature the relationship between the plan and the problem area, non-policy propositions center on questions of fact or value descriptions. While these fact and value descriptions may imply the possibility of subsequent value choices, the difference becomes a matter of emphasis (Pfau, et al., 1987). Labeling the issue "inherency" suggests the following analytic possibilities.

First is the question of whether an advocate's reasoning chain is consistent. Assuming that the chain of reasoning is a necessary path to arrive at a specified

conclusion, the advocate violates inherency when s/he cannot sustain each part of the sequence. While it may be possible to arrive at the same conclusion through alternative constructions of reasoning—a concept the general systems theorists call equifinality (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 46)—an advocate bears the responsibility of sustaining correspondence between the path chosen and the evidence alleged to support the claim. Sources who commonly claim "world peace" may have the same end state in mind but cannot be used interchangably when one presupposes an arms buildup while another assumes disarmament as the means of achieving the goal.

A second inherency application is to force the opposing advocate to give an accounting for the cause or reason underlying a claim. It is possible to observe an effect (observable event) without knowledge of the necessary or sufficient conditions required to cause the event (Copi, 1978, p. 401). In the case of tidal patterns, the effect of tides was observed long before it was understood that the gravitational force of the sun, moon, and other planetary bodies was operating. Except in very limited circumstances, not to require an accounting of cause is to concede that reason-governed choice is not relevant to argumentative discourse. We insist upon an accounting because we presume that as autonomous decision makers we can independently evaluate evidence and reasons as sufficient to justify a claim. Failure to require this standard is to defer actual decision-making to unspecified others.

A third implication for inherency argument is based on the argumentative continuity among propositions of fact, value, and policy. Numerous authors on debate theory have maintained a close connection among these three propositional types. Cronkhite (1966) noted that "a proposition of policy is merely a proposition of value extended into the future" (p. 14). Matlon (1978) and Vasilius (1983) wrote that values are intertwined with policies and cannot be divorced from their policy implications. More recently Dudczak (1983), Rowland (1983), and Herbeck and Wong (1986) have argued that separation of propositional types as distinct creates an artificial separation resulting in the exclusion of otherwise relevant issues from the debate.

The connection among propositional types which these theorists have acknowledged legitimizes inherency to the extent that CEDA debaters have introduced plans. A plan requires the consideration of inherency in the traditional plan-solvency constellation. To allow affirmative advocates the option of introducing plans in "non-policy" debates should afford the negative team the perogative of determining whether the plan is sufficient to overcome the obstacles preventing the solution of the alleged problem. If value debate mimicks policy debate through the introduction of "quasi-policy" plans, then the full arsenal of "quasi-policy" stock issues should be afforded the counter-advocate. To the extent that inherency has traditionally been a part of this arsenal, it should be allowed consideration.

The fourth application of inherency refers to the general requirement that an advocate maintain consistency in the claimed relationship among elements. Whether these relationships are posited as causal or sign, the assumption of consistent description is a prerequisite to alleging correspondence between the evidence grounds and the assumed warrant for claim. Warrants assume a context which is necessary to infer movement from ground to claim (Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1984). Without correspondence between the context assumed by the warrant with the context assumed in the grounds, there is no justifiable movement from ground to claim.

Finally, the lexical standard for inherency insists on the consistent, unambiguous use of terms across contexts and across sources of information. It is important to preserve the semantic intent of meaning assumed by definitions. An advocate violates this standard of inherency when s/he applies one standard of meaning at one instance, and violates it at another.

Inherency arguments are applicable to non-policy propositions in at least each of the preceding senses—to verify the chain of reasoning, to require a causal accounting, to allow quasi-policy stock issues when affirmatives insist on quasi-policy plans, to maintain correspondence in the movement from ground to claim, and to maintain the lexical integrity of meaning. While the development of potential issues will continue to fill the vacuum created by alternative debate formats, an inherency issue should be part of the analysis of any proposition, regardless of its type. In short, inherency is an intrinsic element to the analysis of a proposition—Inherency is inherent to debate.

References

Bertalanffy, L. von. (1968). *General system theory* (rev. ed.). New York: George Braziller.

Brock, B. (1974, November). *Changing concepts in forensics*. Paper presented at Speech Communication Association Convention, Chicago, IL.

Brock, B., Chesebro, J., Cragan, J., & Klumpp, J. (1973). *Public policy decision-making: Systems analysis and comparative advantage debate*. New York: Harper & Row.

Brockriede, W. (1975). Where is argument? *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 11*, 179-182.

Cherwitz, R. A., & Hikins, J. W. (1977). Inherency as a multi-dimensional construct: A rhetorical approach to the proof of causation. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14*, 82-90.

Chesebro, J. (1971). Beyond the orthodox: The criteria case. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 7*, 208-215.

Copi, I. M. (1978). *Introduction to logic* (5th ed.). New York: MacMillan.

Cronkhite, G. (1966). Propositions of past and future fact and value: A proposed classification. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 3*, 11-16.

Dudczak, C. A. (1983). Value argumentation in a competitive setting: An inhibition to ordinary language use. In D. Zarefsky. M. O. Sillars, & J. Rhodes (Eds.), *Argument in transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 837-844). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Dudczak, C. A. (1987). Inherency in non-policy propositions: Rediscovering the "lost" issue. In M. O. Sillars & G. B. Walker (Eds.), *Argument and critical practices: Proceedings of the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 371-377). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Fischer, D. H. (1970). *Historian's fallacies: Toward a logic of historical thought*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Goodnight, T. V., Balthrop, W., & Parson, D. W. (1974). The problem of inherency: Strategy and substance. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 10*, 229-240.

Herbeck, D., & Wong, K. (1986). The indivisibility of value claims from policy propositions: An argument for policy in value debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 7,* 14-28.

Matlon, R. J. (1978). Debating propositions of value. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14,* 194-204.

Pfau, M., Thomas, D. A., & Ulrich, W. (1987). *Debate and argument: A systems approach to advocacy.* Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Random House Dictionary of the English Language, unabridged. 1966. New York: Random House.

Rowland, R. C. (1983). The philosophical presuppositions of value debate. In D. Zarefsky, M. O. Sillars, & J. Rhodes (Eds.), *Argument in transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation* (pp. 822-836). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Schunk, J. F. (1978). A farewell to 'structural change': The cure for pseudo-inherency. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14,* 144-149.

Smith, C. R., & Hunsaker, D. M. (1972). *The bases of argument: Ideas in conflict.* Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.

Thomas, D. A., & Hart, J. (1987). *Advanced debate* (3rd ed.). Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook.

Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., & Janik, A. (1984). *An introduction to reasoning* (2nd ed.). New York: MacMillan.

Vasilius, J. E. (1983). Back to basics: An intercultural approach to value proposition debate. *CEDA Yearbook, 4,* 13-17.

Willard, C. A. (1976, November). *The nature and implications of the 'policy perspective' for the evaluation of oral argument.* Paper presented at Speech Communication Association Convention, San Francisco, CA.

Wood, S., & Midgley, J. (1986). *Prima facie: A guide to value debate.* DuBuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt.

Zarefsky, D. (1977). The role of causal argument in policy controversies. *Journal of the American Forensic Association, 13,* 179-191.

Ziegelmueller, G. W., & Dause, C. A. (1975). *Argumentation: Inquiry and advocacy.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

INTRINSIC JUSTIFICATION: MEANING AND METHOD

Kenneth Bahm
Southern Illinois University

T he theoretical issue of intrinsicness has been emerging in an increasing number of debate rounds. Basically, the argument from intrinsicness states that the benefits or harms claimed by one side must flow intrinsically (necessarily or essentially) from that side's resolutional ground. On the Fall 1987 CEDA topic for example, negatives argued that the affirmative indictment must be based on some necessary aspect of U.S. covert involvement in Central America (like secrecy or deception) rather than upon some accidental or contingent property (like sponsoring torture or funding operations through illicit arms sales). In short, non-policy debaters did not want to be stuck defending a specific and coincidental (albeit, at times, current) policy arrangement and they began to make use of the intrinsicness argument as a shield.

Ulrich (1984a) has defended the debate round as an excellent forum for the development of theory, but this should not cause us to neglect the literature. One function of a literature on debate should be to evaluate and improve upon theory that has emerged from rounds. Ideally, there should be a dialogue about theory as published and theory as argued in rounds. This article will attempt to promote this dialogue by considering the round-developed issue of intrinsicness in non-policy debate. Reconstructing intrinsicness in phenomenological terms will provide the argument with a language, a goal, and a means of testing. After an initial look at some applicable concepts of phenomenology, attention will turn to the harms of contingent justification and the solutions offered by a phenomenology-based approach to intrinsicness.

Phenomenology: Separating the Essential from the Accidental

Polkinghorne (1983) defines phenomenology as "the science of the essential structures of consciousness" (p. 41). Merleau-Ponty (1962) elaborates on the scope of this perspective: "Phenomenology is the study of essences, and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence of perception, or the essence of consciousness" (p. vii).

Phenomenology holds that sense-data are constituted in meaningful configurations within our consciousness. In other words, meaning is an organized system. Language is considered to be a prime organizing principle, and this leads Wittgenstein (1975) to refer to phenomenology as primarily a grammatical exercise. Phenomenology then aims at a discovery of the essential structures of language or grammar. In this way phenomenology's emphasis on deriving invariant structures of meaning closely parallels the objective of intrinsicness, which is to discover essential definition or interpretation. This commonality of purpose should allow phenomenology to serve as a useful