Note
This paper was composed for GOVT 490 in the Turabian format, it is presented here with minimal edits and some format adjustments.
Glennon, Michael J. 2016. National Security and Double Government. Updated edition. London: Oxford University Press.
The more things change, the more they stay the same, or so Professor Michael J. Glennon argues in his book National Security and Double Government. Writing to inform and propose potential solutions and delving deep into the operation of the United States’ intelligence and military communities, Glennon offers an explanation for policy continuity based in a culture of conformity, perverse incentive structures, and increasing reliance on experts to preserve national security. He argues that government works through two layers of institutions, the Madisonian institutions that are public facing, elected, and operate within the bounds of the Constitution and the Trumanite institutions which forms a loose network of upper-level personnel who determine actual policy using the Madisonians as a veneer of credibility.
The first chapter begins with the similarities between the Obama and Bush administrations national security policies. Surveillance policies, targeted killings, and other international and domestic meddling continued apace, despite Obama’s rhetoric preelection criticisms, the only notable change being the end to torture and even in that, those who engaged in torture weren’t prosecuted (Glennon 2016, 1). Common explanations of the policies in place actually being optimal and politics functioning as a complex model that makes change nearly impossible are then dismissed, the first because it assumes that decision calculi are universal when they are not, and the second because it fails to usefully model anything. Glennon proposes that the correct model is based on English philosopher Walter Bagehot’s idea of double government. Essentially, democratic institutions (Madisonian institutions) are used to veil the operations of bureaucrats and unelected officials (the Trumanite network). The uniformed public maintains its confidence in outward facing institutions while the real work of governance is done by experts from the shadows.
Chapter two describes the origins of the Trumanite network, starting with the history behind the expansive national security bureaucracy and its formation in the wake of WWII with the creation of a cornucopia of national security agencies. In the present day, presidential control over the hundreds of thousands of government employees under their roof’s is next to impossible and unelected bureaucrats have formed the Trumanite network, a loose group of top officials who advise the president and enact major policy. These workers often engage in threat exaggeration and have an ever-increasing drive for secrecy and knowledge, all while building systems, allowing any decision to be unattributable to a single individual, creating an environment where disconformity is incredibly risky and discouraged. In such an environment. policies achieve lives of their own and become difficult to dislodge even by elected officials, meaning that “the Trumanite network has achieved, in a word, autonomy” (Glennon 2016, 26).
In the third chapter, Glennon explains how the illusion of the Madisonian (the President, Congress, and Courts) institutional control is explained by five attributes. “Historical pedigree, ritual, intelligibility, mystery, and harmony” maintain public confidence and trust in the Madisonian institutions (Glennon 2016, 30). Pedigree is generated by the Constitution and rosy memories of past politicians; rituals, like the presidential inauguration and state of the union address, provides further nostalgia and solemnity; the legibility of the Constitution generates trust and confidence that action can be taken; the distance of Washington and arcane inner workings of politics create a degree of mystery around the political class that cause it to be revered; and harmony between the Madisonians institutions and Trumanite network drives confidence that everything is under control. Those elements along with the public’s desire for all to well create the perception of an accountable government that maintains stasis and representation.
Chapter four tears down the illusion. Glennon shows that the courts are often made up of former members or sympathetic to the Trumanite network, reliably supporting policies invasive surveillance and other dubious intelligence and military activities either explicitly or through standing and political questions doctrines. He takes special note of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and its system of “secret law” that abjures public engagement and can sometimes even hide information from justices meant to decide its cases (Glennon 2016, 45). Congress is shown similarly weak. Members, especially the rank-and-file, are incentivized to trust Trumanites, if only because they are busy; delegate power to avoid electoral responsibility; and are poorly briefed by the intelligence community. Finally, the president is as dependent on the Trumanites as they are on him. He relies on them to brief him, provide options for action, draft policy, and run the national security apparatus. In many instances, the president serves as a rubber stamp for Trumanites deferring to their expertise and then taking credit for their policies to maintain legitimacy. Even when the Trumanites fail to achieve policy goals in the short-term, new administrations and congresses provide new opportunities to push such policies.
The fifth chapter outlines how the Trumanite network functions after dislodging the default models as either too narrow or lacking explanatory power. He characterizes the network as a loosely defined group of officials who operate using standard procedures that are built to over-estimate threats due to lack of consequences for over-preparation and extreme consequences for failures. Such over-estimation also increases Trumanite power through expanded budgets and authorities further compounding such incentives. This, combined with the leaderless and ambiguous nature of the network, makes the network difficult to explicitly identify or root out while preserving conditions for groupthink and conformity.
In the penultimate chapter, Glennon proposes potential problems of declines in democratic control and the solutions that might solve the problems of double government. According to him, the implosion of Madisonian institutions could create authoritarian rule in the event of civil unrest or disaster collapsing trust in government and triggering retribution against protesting citizens. A combination of strengthened internal checks and civic virtue are necessary to prevent such collapse and reinvigorate Madisonian institutions. Unfortunately, such shifts will be difficult. Internal checks have already been attempted and broadly failed while external checks could generate triple government, compounding already existing problems. Therefore, the only sustainable solution requires civic virtue and an engaged and informed populace to, themselves, incentivize greater oversight by electing informed officials and seeing beyond inflated threats and alarmism. This solution has is difficult because of widespread civic ignorance, time constraints on the part of average Joes, and the contradiction of liberalism making it difficult for a government to both cultivate a specific view of government while opposing governmental impositions as attacks on freedom of thought.
The book concludes grimly, restating the thesis of the book and elaborating on the seeming inevitability of the status quo. Glennon provides some hope in the fact that double government is perceivable and that there are some benefits to the Trumanite network, but decisively states that such control is not sustainable or desirable, given the dangers of authoritarian control.
The information in this book is cause for concern. Serious declines in democratic engagement and institutions are alarming, and the conclusion causes storm clouds to roll across an already gloomy gray sky. A secondary cause for concern that the book doesn’t address is that similar networks, exercising comparatively less power, exist in other aspects of public life, from education to transportation, adding to the scale of the issue. The slow creation of double government undermines national security and the American system of government and therefore should be opposed prudently and effectively through education and action to revitalize the populace and institutions constructed in the founding of the nation.
The strength of the book comes in its explanation of otherwise confusing events, specifically the continuity of foreign policy across presidential administrations. In that task, Glennon is highly successful. He deftly deflects criticisms and deploys copious citations to support his claims, with around half of the page count made up of endnotes and citations which establish near-term and long-ago historical backing for the already compelling argument. Also thought-provoking, aside from the main thesis is the articulation of the perverse incentives provided to the national security apparatus when making threat assessments and how those create mission creep, expand authorities, and consume valuable resources. That said, there are some flaws in the book’s thesis. Specifically, it is difficult to parse Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan as a decision that would be made or allowed by the Trumanite network, showing that, even if that particular decision was ill-considered, it is possible to take and order actions that are out of line with the network’s ends.
The book’s afterword, reacting to the rise of populism, also has flaws. Its claim that bureaucrats would be incapable of stymying a dedicated populist leader was somewhat disproven by the effectiveness of the bureaucracy in hindering Trump’s first term, and though it was correct that threats of resignation and firings are of limited effect, it failed to recognize that even ostensible populist appointees are enchanted by the Trumanite mystique of expertise, making their ability to confound policy more potent than estimated.
Overall, the book is effective in its purpose, showing how the structure of the government has allowed an expert class of bureaucrats to step in and run much of the national security apparatus with Congress and the rest of government serving as a veneer of democratic legitimacy. Demonstrating through numerous examples and rebutting counter-theories, Glennon has chillingly explained foreign policy continuity and unveiled the power of national security officials to hold democratic institutions on puppet strings while orchestrating real policy themselves.